SYRSKYI AND NEW APPOINTMENTS IN AFU

As we know, Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander of the Land Forces and commander of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group (OSG), has been appointed the new commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

Let's talk about the attitude to Syrskyi in the Armed Forces. Let's talk about his combat experience and the operations he was responsible for. What can Syrskyi change, what are the expectations and hopes?

COMPARISON OF ZALUZHNYI AND SYRSKYI

I would like to say that it is simply impossible to compare any other commander or general with Valerii Zaluzhnyi in full. At the beginning of the war, Zaluzhnyi became the center of Ukrainian resistance, I want to remind you that the Ukrainian leadership, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, President Zelenskyy, other Ukrainian leaders, Defense Minister Reznikov, in fact, kept saying that there would be no war until the last day. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not declare martial law. Thus, he did not allow the military command to make decisions on the situation, build defensive structures, prepare for or blow up bridges in advance, which, of course, should have been done the day before.

Also, the territorial defense forces (TDF) were not deployed. People were simply not given weapons in time, so on February 24, they were simply distributed from cars. The operational reserve was not called up to military units. In other words, Ukraine was not really prepared for defense. If the army had behaved passively and Zaluzhnyi had not made decisions or taken responsibility, then frankly speaking, what kind of resistance could there have been? Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy simply removed himself from defense management. That's why Valerii Zaluzhnyi took over all the responsibility. He took over the deployment of troops, and in recent days, under Zaluzhnyi's responsibility, our combat brigades left their permanent locations and began deploying to defend the country. These were not sufficient measures to completely repel the first Russian attack. But if these measures had not been taken, resistance would have been impossible. Therefore, of course, Valerii Zaluzhnyi was responsible for the entire game, speaking in chess terms, on the entire board. 

All those Russian offensives from all sides, he took responsibility for the distribution of available forces and means, for the transfer of ammunition, especially munitions, and for the concentration of resources in one direction or another. Of course, the fate of Ukraine depended, without exaggeration, on these first steps in the first hours and on the eve of the invasion itself. Therefore, it is simply impossible to compare anyone to Zaluzhnyi. He has already gone down in history. But, of course, friends, this does not mean that without Valerii Zaluzhnyi, in general, Ukraine is not able to resist. Of course, the resistance is people’s. Valerii Zaluzhnyi had and still has a very important role in this people’s resistance, as a moral core and a symbol of resistance. This is also very important, because people, especially those who go to their deaths, who risk themselves every day, need to be believed. They need to believe that our struggle is not in vain, that people risk their lives because someone is leading them to victory. Valerii Zaluzhnyi was and still is the person who has the greatest trust in the army. Of course, no other statesman can compare to him. But I don't think that Valerii Zaluzhnyi lost his moral qualities just because he lost his position. I think that now that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyi has made changes within the framework of the Constitution and Oleksandr Syrskyi has been appointed, now in any scenario it is the business of each of us to nevertheless contribute, to do everything possible to improve the quality of army management, to do everything possible for our success and to help the new army leadership take the right actions. 

To make it clear what is going to happen in the army, we are talking about Syrskyi and the new appointments.

As for the comparison with Zaluzhnyi, I said, how can we compare? Syrskyi was in charge of certain areas, while Zaluzhnyi was responsible for everything. Therefore, I think there should be added pressure to this artificial confrontation. Now Oleksandr Syrskyi will have to prove that he is a worthy successor to Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and at the same time, Syrskyi has a great opportunity to start systematically correcting the problems that really exist in the organization and management, training and use of the Armed Forces and to remain in a worthy place in history, trying to find his successor. This will not be easy, because after all, Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi are people with different styles of behavior and different characters, different methods of management. 

I'll give you my subjective opinion as to why Zaluzhnyi is really loved. Zaluzhnyi is loved not because, as the Office of the President thinks and spreads on the Internet, this is an invention of the opposition, it is some kind of PR, as President Zelenskyy said very rudely that "Valera loves swearing." This was a statement from Zelenskyy that was beyond the bounds of decency. But in fact, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is respected in the army. What is it based on? The main link in the army on which decision-making depends is the command staff. These are brigade commanders, battalion commanders, first of all. These are the people who produce results on the battlefield. So, Zaluzhnyi is a person who is known in the army for being virtually conflict-free. Zaluzhnyi is not trying to destroy anyone. He does not follow such an exclusively hierarchical logic of appointments and attitude towards people. I would say so. If we talk about the level of management, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is a person who is trying to manage people in the army. Not positions, not rank, but people, first and foremost. Of course, the army is a system, a structure, and this method of management has its drawbacks, of course. But for the Ukrainian system, for the Ukrainian army, this method of management, when people are managed first and foremost, is very unusual. Because in our hierarchical status system, this is an unusual process.

Oleksandr Syrskyi is exactly the kind of person who does not manage people. He manages processes. He tries to manage processes. On the one hand, it is more orderly, more understandable in the hierarchical structure. But since our army is a very poorly organized and fragmented, chaotic structure, managing processes in it often means coming into conflict with logic and with people who solve different tasks and take the initiative at different levels in this army. That is why there is such a gap. Zaluzhnyi brought a new method, a new style. He is not trying to destroy anyone. He is trying not to conflict. And Syrskyi is a really tough person. And there is such a big problem that with the key link in the war - the brigades and combatants - with whom Zaluzhnyi is trying to build harmonious relations, I don't say that he has built harmonious relations, I say that he is trying to build harmonious relations, it is with this key link that Oleksandr Syrskyi has big problems. Because he is such a person...he has a method similar to many of our generals, unfortunately, many of our statesmen - micromanagement. And Oleksandr Syrskyi very often tries to set tasks for individual platoons, individual companies from the position of commander of an operational and tactical group, which actually disrupts the management system and makes it difficult for brigade commanders and battalion commanders to manage. Such micromanagement creates chaos and criticism in the troops. Every military man understands that multi-tasking and rigid execution of tasks when troops are fragmented is not entirely effective. This micromanagement is the basis for such a great deal of criticism.

There are many emotions in war. There are different management styles. I believe that in modern warfare, both people management and process management are simply components. We need military leaders to always be responsible for the result. In my opinion, we have a major problem with responsibility for the result. And for Oleksandr Syrskyi, the main challenge, in my opinion, will be that he will need to move away from managing individual platoons and restore institutional trust and interaction with the key elements in the war. These are brigadiers, brigade commanders and battalion commanders. Trust and interaction are created primarily in the command chain. If there is no such trust, then, of course, these attitudes in the army cannot be changed. I don't think Syrskyi can... I don't really even think he needs to fight for the image of the second Zaluzhnyi. He won't be able to be that sociable. I hope that he will just find his niche in this regard and try to look for efficiency, rationality in his actions, not external effects. This would be very necessary for us.

There is a lot of writing here about Syrskyi and Russia. Friends, I don't think that Oleksandr Syrskyi's biography and military career show that he is somehow dependent on Russia. Yes, of course, he studied in Russia. He has relatives in Russia, it's true. But his path in the war shows that he still does not depend on Russia in any way. He can be criticized for his decisions. Now we will analyze the operations, and among the operations he led, there were successful operations for Ukraine, where Ukrainian troops achieved not only success but also strategic surprise. I think we all understand that all of this would have been simply impossible if there had been any Russian influence. That's why we are closing this topic right away.

WHO WILL BECOME SYRSKYI

There are serious challenges to who Syrskyi will become. He will have to prove what he can do in his new position. He will have to learn in his new position. To build not only a reputation. First and foremost, institutional trust. Trust is the main problem that the army lacks. And now the new appointment of Syrskyi, the army's command staff, no one has such positive expectations. Well, most people do. But I do not believe that Syrskyi is a person who is not aware of these risks. He watches and follows both videos and texts quite closely. He watches a lot of streams, including critical streams. I've been told that he also watches some of the streams I record. Therefore, I hope that a person who receives information from outside, including critical information, will draw conclusions and try to become himself and show his effectiveness. With so much pressure... that is, Syrskyi has no hope. The army has no hope for him. On the one hand, this is bad. On the other hand, it's good. He will have to show results, and people will accept them without high expectations. We will see. We will monitor everything that happens in the army quite critically. I'm just not going to immediately sprinkle ashes on my head because the war is ongoing. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy has made his decision. So we will see how Syrsky will work now and evaluate him objectively.

SYRSKYI'S COMBAT PATH

Now we're going to go through Syrskyi's battlefield briefly. So, I've been hearing propaganda from the President's Office that Syrskyi won the battle for Kyiv, that Syrskyi won the battle for Kharkiv. Once again, I emphasize that Syrskyi did receive command, not immediately, of the group of troops that defended Kyiv. Syrskyi did indeed command not one but two successful Kharkiv offensives near Kharkiv. But he did not do it alone. The redistribution of forces, means, the issuance of munitions, the concentration of forces in certain areas, all this, of course, was fully known and approved according to the general plan at the Supreme Command, but it was primarily the responsibility and planning of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi.

So, let's look at Kyiv. Indeed, the deployment of troops around Kyiv was a decision made by Zaluzhnyi himself before the invasion. Shortly after the defense of Kyiv began, a group was created there, which was entrusted to Syrskyi. But, of course, the defense of Kyiv was a joint effort of both Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi. And indeed, it was such a national uprising. People were just going, going forward to look for the enemy. Syrskyi, of course, was in command of this group. As we know, the Russian troops got stuck in the Makariv area and the intention of the Russian troops to surround Kyiv from the north and from the south, from the west and from the east, to completely surround the city, failed. The Russian troops, the Russian command, were unable to cope with the cover of their communications. At the beginning of the fighting, on the first day, it was very much chaos. To what extent everything depended on Syrskyi's talents, I will not tell you. Because in fact, at that moment, it was such a people's rage. People were searching even without commands, they were looking for weapons first and foremost. The battle for Kyiv was a frontal confrontation, in principle, the enemy was stopped by improvised forces from different sides. But of course, for example, the Moshchun area, this crossing, was the subject of Syrskyi's personal attention, the battle for Moshchun. The use of troops in that area depended on him. So we can say that Syrskyi played an important role, a very important role in the battle for Kyiv. But really, where, in my opinion, we can say that there were successful actions that were commanded by Syrskyi, it was the May offensive near Kharkiv in 2022 and the September-October offensive in the Kharkiv region, the Izium-Balakliia operation. 

Syrskyi's first independent successful operation, of course, in which his role was decisive, was the battle for Kharkiv in May 22. At that time, Ukrainian troops, primarily the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, reinforced by brigades and battalions of the TDF, reinforced by the battalion tactical group of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, the presidential brigade, and a separate battalion from Yavoriv. That is, with significant forces. Indeed, they made a rapid breakthrough, breaking the defense of Russian troops on a wide front, which led to the retreat of Russian troops to the state border. And the Russians were forced back far from the city of Kharkiv. The immediate threat to Kharkiv was removed. The planning and responsibility for this operation was on Syrskyi. This offensive was generally successful for us. The Russians suffered heavy losses. They were completely knocked out of Kharkiv. We knocked the enemy back to the borders quickly, and then a very difficult battle began, especially in the area of Pytomnyk, Dementiivka, where, unfortunately, our infantry began frontal attacks on the enemy's echeloned prepared defense by order of the command. These were very difficult, very bloody battles with very little result, unfortunately. This was the exchange of manpower. Participants in these battles were very critical of such methods of use at the time. But in general, yes, there were heavy losses, but this breakthrough and the fact that the 92nd Mechanized Brigade was reinforced with such significant forces and effectively and successfully defeated the enemy near Kharkiv, together with other troops, our other units, was really... the planning for this operation was in Syrskyi. 

The second operation is the most famous in the Kharkiv region. This is the Izium-Barvinkove operation or the Balakliia breakthrough, which led to the complete defeat of the Russians. On the Internet, it is also seen as a kind of independent operation. In fact, it should be said that all the preconditions for this operation to be successful were created through actions on the entire front. At that time, Valerii Zaluzhnyi redistributed most of his efforts and the bulk of the munitions to the Kherson direction. The Russians held a large foothold on the Right Bank of Ukraine, holding Kherson, and Ukrainian troops were striking with all their might at this foothold. They inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. The main forces of the Russian army at that time were concentrated in the Kherson direction. The enemy was severely depleted.

In an interview, I think with NV, in June, when I was talking about the war prospects, I said that in September the Russian army would lose its combat capability. My assessment was based on the fact that I saw the rate of losses that the Russians had in the Kherson direction and in other parts of the front, but especially in the Kherson region. It was clear that the Russian army simply could not sustain this rate of losses. They did not have such a large maneuver of firepower, air defense, and artillery on the Right Bank. It was difficult for them. And the Ukrainian troops were quite successful in defeating these groups, albeit with significant losses on our part. But the Russians moved all their most capable troops to Kherson. This made it possible to plan the Kharkiv offensive in September-October 22 quite successfully. It should be noted that Oleksandr Syrskyi played a key role in planning this operation. He insisted on the choice of routes for this operation, on the concentration of specific forces, and some of the best Ukrainian formations were concentrated for this operation. The 92nd Mechanized Brigade, the 90th Air Assault Brigade, the 25th Air Assault Brigade, the 4th Reserve Tank Brigade, there were a significant number of new tanks that arrived from Poland, and a significant number of other units, including special forces, were involved. Of course, this played a very important role. At that time, both the 80th and 92nd were very well-equipped. They had a large number of motivated volunteers at all levels and were qualitatively, by an order of magnitude, superior to any Russian unit in terms of their composition. That's why they made the maneuver quickly. They were motivated, they moved forward quickly. And the presence of these high-quality troops, which were formed entirely of volunteers at that time, played a key role in that rapid breakthrough and the defeat of the Izium-Barvinkiv group of Russian troops that fled from Balakliia, from that area. 

If all the Russian forces were not concentrated in Donbas and Kherson, then, of course, the Russians would have had reserves. But they had no reserves. There were no forces to parry the sudden attack of our selected troops near Balakliia and Izium. And so what happened happened. Indeed, this is a victory, a successful offensive operation, where Oleksandr Syrskyi was the leader in this direction - not in general, I emphasize, but in this direction, indeed, Oleksandr Syrskyi was the leader. But this success in the operation was based entirely on surprise. Therefore, to say that..., Syrskyi obviously has ties with Russia, but they do not influence him. There should be no doubt that he is really on our side, that he is for Ukraine.

MANAGEMENT METHODS OF SYRSKYI

There are doubts and criticisms about his management methods. Why, in my opinion, does this show up? Very often in a war, the enemy has a great advantage in means of destruction. And very often, when our command wants to compensate for this advantage, orders are given at various levels to stand to the death, to stand to the end, to hold a position, and improvised units, combined platoons, detachments, companies are created to replenish losses in one direction or another. And this is where micromanagement often fails. Improvised units, temporary ones, do not have full support, replenishment, command and control, or communication. And always the use of attached forces in our army is a big mess. Of course, here, when such critical circumstances exist, this on and on and on saga begins. Such methods, of course, are not effective in war. And as we suffer losses and the best brigades lose their combat capability, because volunteers cannot fight indefinitely, we need mobilized personnel, we need rotations. As the number of volunteers decreased in '23 and the combat capability of the regular brigades decreased, these methods of "standing to the death" began to work poorly. But they continued to be used and are still used today. It is inefficient, and of course, those commanders who use such methods cannot be popular and will never be popular. In my opinion, this is because, first of all, it is absolutely unjustified tactically. Exchanging people for what? For a little while? This is unjustified very often by the situation.  

SYRSKYI AND BAKHMUT

Syrskyi was appointed commander of the Khortytsia OSGT and was responsible for the battle for Bakhmut at the decisive stage. Unfortunately, there were some problematic decisions at this point. For example, they began to dismiss brigade commanders. Moreover, they started removing high-quality brigade commanders. This was very negative, in fact. I want to note how negative, in my opinion, the dismissal of the commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Shevchuk, which was very resonant at the time, played a role. It was a decision of Oleksandr Syrskyi. I think that time shows how wrong that decision was, absolutely unreasonable, not in line with the situation, because there was a desire to stand and hold the positions, but there was no supply of ammunition. There was no provision for replenishment. There were no positions to retreat to. And of course, the 93rd Mechanized Brigade performed miracles under our command. This was due to effective and efficient management. Our troops were suffering significant losses, but where the 93rd was standing, Wagner was just suffering huge losses with minimal actual advancement. And instead of awarding Shevchuk and all his combatants with the title of Heroes of Ukraine, they dismissed Shevchuk and several of his combatants. It was just a deeply flawed decision. Later, when the 93rd had already been withdrawn, unfortunately, the frontline fell in many areas and personnel changes also began, with some being removed and some not being removed for some reason, despite all the withdrawals. Such things cannot be justified in the army, at least there should be some justice and logic, but these are very subjective things.

I have read the report of the Khortytsia OSGT on the reasons for the loss of the city of Soledar. I can tell you frankly that this report does not reflect the real situation and what actually happened in Soledar. The reasons are actually problems of execution. This is a very slow response from the operational and tactical department, from the operational and strategic department of Khortytsia itself. And there, in this report, the responsibility was shifted solely to the brigadiers and poorly trained soldiers. These are, in my opinion, very incorrect conclusions and very wrong conclusions. I hope that... I understand why this was done. Because in the army, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy made an artificial competition between Syrskyi and Zaluzhnyi. I don't know why he did it. This is complete nonsense from the point of view of military management. There are two armies - the army of Syrskyi and the army of Zaluzhnyi. It's completely absurd. But, unfortunately, every OSGT - Tarnavskyi's OSGT, Syrskyi's OSGT, they each reported to the headquarters that the situation was tense but under control. I have the impression that they even competed to see who would be more optimistic in assessing the situation. So instead of saying in time that we have a critical situation, we need equipment, engineering organizations, construction companies, we need to build defensive lines, structures, instead there was a constant game of optimism, and this led to serious consequences. First, in just a few days, the defense in Soledar collapsed, we lost the city, which the 93rd Brigade had been successfully defending for a very long time. The defense was falling apart everywhere. Then, in the same way, because of the problems with the use of troops, there were too many people, and there was no proper use of them. The troops were deployed in a single line, and the Wagner, which acted in a concentrated manner, in echelons in narrow areas, simply knocked out one battalion after another.  

The Russians in general suffered more losses than we did. But the exchange of people in the proportion we had in Bakhmut was not advantageous for us. We were exchanging prisoners for motivated volunteers, a large number of mobilized people. To be honest, for a long time, Wagner was repelled by our well-organized troops, such as the 93rd Brigade. They did it well. Many of the military men with whom I talk to say that the problem of the use of troops, i.e. the organization of command and control by the higher command, was the main reason why the defense failed. I have not seen a report on the reasons for the loss of Bakhmut. I saw that our authorities, the Ministry of Defense, are trying to say that we have not lost Bakhmut and Soledar, that we are fighting some kind of battle on the territory of Bakhmut. I don't understand why they say these political things. Playing politics - again, I hope that this will stop simply. Politicking in assessing the situation is absolutely unacceptable.

Therefore, there are things that characterize Syrskyi positively, such as the two Kharkiv offensives. But there are things that are critical of Oleksandr Syrskyi. These are Bakhmut, Soledar, and the dismissal of several competent commanders who did not add to his support and authority in the army. There is still no objective analysis of what is going on at the front, what is wrong with Soledar and Bakhmut. Therefore, all these mistakes are being repeated now. They are being repeated now in Avdiivka. They are being repeated now in the Kupiansk direction, on the Lyman, when there are no defensive positions equipped and concreted to hide the infantry well, to protect them from artillery fire. There is no engineering equipment. There is no echeloned use of troops. The troops are used brigade by brigade in one thin line, quickly exhausted. They are replaced in the same way by another brigade. They are exhausted again. Such exhaustion is ineffective, as the military themselves say. So, of course, this is a big challenge.

On the other hand, I can say that Syrskyi has made some quite reasonable personnel decisions. I can't say that they are all bad. Let's hope that some conclusions will be drawn. The commanders of the operational and tactical departments that General Syrskyi is appointing raise big questions. They may be good administrators, clerical workers, but in my subjective opinion, we still need commanders who come from brigade commanders. Those who have experience in modern warfare and have shown results, their results in this war. They have shown their competence. Generals appointed for example, Bohomolov appointed to the Soledar operational-tactical group - there are so many questions about their actions that one of the commanders even filed a report against Bohomolov, and an internal investigation was conducted. Yes, we have one such brave brigade commander in the Armed Forces, one of our best commanders, who filed a report that the commander of the OTG Bohomolov was incompetent in organizing combat operations. There was an internal investigation. Oleksandr Syrskyi acted very diplomatically. He did not dismiss Bohomolov, but he did not dismiss this brigade commander either. He is not an easy person to dismiss, to be honest. In this case, Syrskyi was diplomatic. But the problem has not disappeared. 

What I hope to see after Syrskyi's appointment and what the main challenge is. I very much doubt that a political logic will be built, that Zelenskyy will still trust Syrskyi and the Presidential Office will stop interfering, and that this artificial confrontation between the army units created by Zelenskyy and Yermak will be destroyed. We need one vertical of command and one vertical of responsibility in the army. So that generals do not point at each other that it was not me, he spoke to the Office himself. We need to stop this practice, it is wrong. There must be full responsibility - did Zelenskyy entrust the army to Syrskyi? Please give him the authority. He should appoint people he trusts, preferably from among the brigadiers, not his loyal close generals. He should put the operational and tactical departments in charge first because they are the ones who make war. Competent commanders are needed at the level of brigades, at least. I'm not talking about battalions. At least the level of the brigades. Those people who are responsible for the result, and not just sitting at the Command and Observation Post and making reports twice a day. And I hope that there will be changes in the competent brigade commanders at the level of the General Staff and at the level of the command of the military services. Changes not because someone is good or bad. In fact, these changes can even take place horizontally. But we need new modern views, because the war is changing so rapidly that no academy, no national defense university, no length of service gives you the experience of 3 months of commanding a brigade in the first line. Nothing can replace it. This is the best experience, the best academy. Therefore, there is no need to hold on to this service period and hierarchy. Will Syrskyi be able to move away from this? His previous experience showed that he will not. Well, let's hope for the best, that people with actual war experience will start getting promoted. We'll see. 

But the main thing, the main problem, in my opinion, of our army is the first thing: we need institutional trust in the high command. There are problems with this. It is necessary because in the army, unfortunately, you have to think a lot about how to report. There are a lot of false reports. These lies in the reports, in the assessment of the situation, used to be caused by the fact that the President's Office quarreled with the army, actually divided it into two parts. I hope that the lies will stop now. Trust begins with the fact that lies stop. There is no need to lie to people. We should not lie about the situation, that everything is fine. We need to say objectively: we have big problems, we will not hold the front unless we do the first, second, and third things.

WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SYRSKYI IN THE FIRST PLACE

That is, there must be trust, and we must stop lying. And the third key factor for our leaders is responsibility. There must be responsibility. Now Syrskyi has all the power. That's it. He doesn't need to compete anymore. He has to take responsibility. What responsibility? First of all, Avdiivka. Lyman-Torske, that area. Kupiansk. The Vuhledar-Novomykhailivka-Marinka area, the Russian offensive in that direction. So we need to make strategic decisions and strengthen the command. Ukraine needs, and the Ukrainian army critically needs, to strengthen its command at the operational and tactical level, first of all. These operational and tactical departments must also be strengthened. These should be full-time structures. We have a very complex management system. We have operational and strategic departments. They actually duplicate the work of operational and tactical departments as offices. We need to finally decide why we need so many headquarters. Why do we need this duplication of the OSGT and the OTG. It seems to me that we need to form a regular corps structure, deploy it, and replace the OTGs with army corps. I don't see any role for the OSGTs except as clerical support structures. It was a political decision to divide the front into OSGTs, so that Syrskyi would be in one and Tarnavskyi in the other. I think this should be stopped now. This is my subjective vision. Again, I communicate with the military and draw these conclusions. So I believe that Syrskyi will receive full political responsibility. We will see. 

NEW APPOINTMENTS

Now, among the new appointments, Vadym Sukharevskyi (appointed on February 10 - Ed.), the commander of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade, will most likely be the new head of a new kind of force, the unmanned systems force. It was he who first gave the order to shoot at the Russians back in April 2014. Of course, the trust in this man, in his combat experience is very high. I thought that his position, his role was, of course, the command of the operational and tactical level, at least. But in principle, the fact that he will now be in charge of unmanned systems is a very positive step, because he is a person who has great trust, is wise enough, understands people and can synthesize complex decisions. I think that trust in him and his reputation will allow him to make at least the first basic decisions in the new branch of troops.

We are discussing the promotion of at least 20 leaders of the Armed Forces, primarily brigadiers, to various positions. We'll see what happens. Because all these promotions and changes are being discussed with Oleksandr Syrskyi himself, there are proposals from the President, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and they are being coordinated with Syrskyi. The first changes are about to take place.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief stated that General Barhylevych would be appointed to replace General Shaptala as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Barhylevych is a person closely associated with Syrskyi. He once commanded the TDF as part of the army, and now, at the moment, he is the chief of staff of the Khortytsia OSGT, which means he is in charge of all current management, supplies Khortytsia, the commander of which is Oleksandr Syrskyi himself. So, of course, Syrskyi has appointed his person to this key position. Let's wait to see what changes will be made in the command of the military services and in the commanders of the operational and tactical departments.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

I think that when parents and relatives live in Russia, of course, a person's heart will not be at ease. But Syrskyi, again, we talked about his biography. Since he commanded the Balakliia breakthrough, I don't think there are any leaks of information from him to Russia. I cannot say that I consider the appointment of Oleksandr Syrskyi to be the best candidate in the Armed Forces from a professional point of view.

On awarding Zaluzhnyi with the Hero of Ukraine Star.

I think this is a justified award in principle, and I think that Zaluzhnyi's role at the beginning of the war allows him to deservedly wear this award. The highest award of Ukraine.

Is General Kryvonos taking part in the hostilities?

General Kryvonos is not involved in hostilities, as he was dismissed from his post by direct instructions of Volodymyr Zelenskyy retroactively, enlisted in the military, and then illegally suspended from military service. Therefore, he is not involved in hostilities. I don't know how General Kryvonos would have commanded any area. He was on the defense, and from the beginning of the war Valerii Zaluzhnyi appointed him as the head of Zhuliany's defense... I don't know, but Kryvonos has authority and respect in the Special Operations Forces. Therefore, as a general army commander, I do not know how he would have performed.

I know that Syrskyi was in command in Debaltseve, but in Debaltseve, the main role in planning and management was played by the Chief of the General Staff, also known as the ATO commander Viktor Muzhenko. And he actually interfered in these management processes very often. Syrskyi also interfered in these processes from time to time. It was, I can say, an unsuccessful operation, a significant number of unsuccessful management decisions. Unfortunately, at that time, the entire Ukrainian high command was just learning how to fight. These were decisions, many decisions simply did not correspond to the situation. The reasons for these decisions, these situations were the same as they are now. The same problems in management, the use of troops, building a defense in one thin line, the lack of strategic reserves, the lack of troop rotation. Everything is as it is now. Unfortunately, we have not drawn any conclusions from Debaltseve. In general, our military command does not like to draw conclusions and stubbornly does not want to apply after-action review, the NATO standard, i.e. after-action analysis. Unfortunately, as we can see, Syrskyi is not doing it either. I hope that Oleksandr Stanislavovych will watch the program and at least start making some changes, because how long can you run on a rake? You see, people quite rightly mention Debaltseve and many other situations can be mentioned. So, of course, changes are needed. But I want to say that Debaltseve is not only Syrskyi's responsibility. Syrskyi was sending and then returning to Debaltseve. There was such a chaos in the management there, which came from the top, of course.

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To be honest, I had my vision that unmanned systems should be operated by people who have already shown great results. We have drone units that are delivering great results on a strategic scale at the front. I hoped that there would be a rational, reasonable solution. Those people who can scale, who can work better with drones, will be promoted. But I also understand the logic of the authorities. Our government can only act using political methods, and it is always looking for PR in everything. They simply cannot make rational decisions. These are the characteristics of President Zelenskyy. He thinks in terms of photo shoots, videos, and speechwriters' texts. He can't do it on his own. As it happened here, he cannot analyze it himself. Therefore, of course, the appointment of Sukharevskyi, I believe, is the best decision Zelenskyy agreed to, because Sukharevskyi is a well-known authoritative figure in the army, a Hero of Ukraine, and was rightly awarded the Hero of Ukraine. This is a person who can unite around him, who has a sharp mind, intelligence, and from a political point of view, this is a really worthy decision. People like Vadym Sukharevskyi deserve to be promoted to various positions. I think that Sukharevskyi will create such a base and then, perhaps, hopefully, he will go to even higher positions, which he is absolutely worthy of.

Reasons for Zaluzhnyi's dismissal

Dear friends, there is no reason for Zaluzhnyi's dismissal, because Volodymyr Zelenskyy never puts forward any clear requirements when appointing any managers, and he never demands a report or explains the reasons. The only thing that Zelenskyy accused Zaluzhnyi of was that, from Zelenskyy's point of view, he was engaged in political activity. We both understand how absurd Zelenskyy's accusations are. But he thinks this way. We will not change him. We understand the level of intelligence of our president. There is nothing to be surprised about.

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I did not go to any consultations, I did not say this on the air. I want to say that just a few representatives, a few members of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, members who belong to the circle of decision-makers, asked my opinion about competent, effective commanders in the army who deserve promotion to leadership positions. And I passed this list of 17 names to several members of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff and thus expressed my vision of who, which officers have the competence and even two generals who, in my opinion, also have the highest competence and qualities. I didn't identify Oleksandr Syrskyi, I'm sorry, I can honestly say that. But I did mention two Ukrainian generals. I respect these people. I will not give you detailed lists now. This is not quite correct. I am not a decision-maker. I was asked for my opinion. I gave an honest answer. Other people make decisions. The responsibility for the appointment of Vadym Sukharevskyi, whom I deeply respect, is the responsibility of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. How they collect information is their responsibility. But they are responsible for the result. In terms of the appointment of Vadym Sukharevskyi, I respect this result and am grateful to Volodymyr Zelenskyy for this initiative and for holding consultations. This is not typical for Zelenskyy. But it's very good that some things are being decided rationally and logically at least somehow.

Regarding Chervinskyi

Unfortunately, Colonel Chervinskyi's illegal detention continues. He is still not even allowed to defend himself. He has been deprived of the right to defence. The authorities simply do not allow witnesses to attend the trial and do not take their testimony into account. This is very sad. We will talk about this separately in the near future.

I want to say the main thing. The resistance of Ukraine depends on each of us. The resistance of Ukraine is not just some individuals in positions of power, with all due respect to Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the resistance of Ukraine is the will of those people who do not hear us now. Those who are in the trenches on the front line. They don't have the Internet there. These are our infantry, these are the soldiers who are on combat duty at the positions, the munitions crew operators. They are the ones who hold that thin blue line on which our freedom and independence stand. It is to them that we are primarily grateful. We will do our best to make sure that the new command tries to be effective in their position. We must help Oleksandr Syrskyi to fulfill his duties as competently as possible. Of course, friends, we will closely monitor these new personnel decisions and give them objective assessments.

Today, as never before, I am confident that Ukraine will win, that we will gain, defend freedom and win peace for our land. Glory to Ukraine!