After action review of Patriot antiaircraft missile battery strike on March 9

On March 9, as a result of the Russian occupants' strike on a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery column near the city of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, at a distance of about 50 km from the front line, two M901 launchers and several MIM-104 anti-aircraft missiles were destroyed. According to Censor.NET, 9 Ukrainian soldiers were killed.

As the radar and command post has survived, the battery's combat capability can be restored soon, and new launchers can be brought in, but unfortunately we will not be able to replace the qualified and motivated operators, some of whom have very successfully completed extensive training at leading NATO training centers. Our sincere condolences go out to the families of the heroes, who shot down several Russian aircraft.

The video from the drone released by the enemy and information from our sources allow us to make an after-action review to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies that seriously undermine Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The strike was carried out by three Iskander ballistic missiles under the guidance of a SuperCam reconnaissance drone.

The launchers were standing in the open in the convoy and did not move.

There was no camouflage on the vehicles.

The cost of the M901 launching station is $10 million, and the cost of the MIM-104 PAC-3 anti-aircraft missile is $4 million.

What factors contributed to the search for an anti-aircraft missile system and made it possible to launch an accurate strike?

1. The battery had been operating in the area for several weeks, had made several successful launches at Russian aircraft, the radar was regularly turned on, and the enemy could determine the approximate search area for its space, electronic reconnaissance and drones.

2. The Patriot positions were not covered by anti-aircraft missile systems to protect them from drones. Given that the battery was operating at a distance from active enemy drone activity, the risk of detection was quite high.

3. The warnings of the drone and missile attacks were received too late.

4. The battery received an order for displacement but did not have time to perform it. Instead of quick and immediate interspersion at maximum speed, the launchers gathered in a shield column and stood in the open waiting for the command to move, forming a target of opportunity.

Conclusions:

1. Maneuvering the battery and leaving the kill zone at maximum speed beyond the range of enemy drones, by individual vehicles, without waiting for commands and columns, should be defined as one of the priorities of combat training.

2. In the event of active combat operations and the unviability of leaving the position area for some time, Patriot positions must be covered by short-range air defense systems.

3. Electronic warfare means, if drones approach Patriot position areas, there should be directional jamming of the enemy's video signal to make it difficult to observe and identify the target.

4. In the Patriot positioning area, deception devices that imitate the operation of the battery should be deployed around the area. Such deception devices are still not used, however, even though the cost of such deception devices is hundreds of times less than the cost of a single launcher. The enemy must constantly see the false targets and spend time identifying them and ammunition for a hit. Real Patriot vehicles must have a camouflage kit to hide their silhouette from quick recognition. The Air Force Command does not use Patriot deception devices, even though it is the most powerful weapon that requires maximum protection.

The responsibility for the destruction of Patriot launchers is fully borne by the Air Force Command, and partially by the battery command, which did not have time to withdraw personnel and equipment from the attack.

Standing in columns in the open in the area of enemy drones is deadly, I ask the servicemen not to wait for a command to move, but to act on the situation, avoid log jam, and not to stand.

This was not the first time that Russians fired at Patriot positions, and unfortunately, it is not the first time that there have been cases of completely inexplicable long stay-in positions and late maneuvers. However, no conclusions have been drawn so far, and it is therefore natural that the lack of after-action review resulted in the March 9 tragedy near Pokrovsk.

War does not forgive unlearned lessons. I hope that the conclusions will finally be drawn, and the troops will receive accurate orders, and systemic changes will finally begin in the tactics of combat use and in the maintenance of air defense.

Yurii Butusov, Censor.NET