Author:  Yurii Butusov

Critically difficult situation in Pokrovsk direction requires immediate decisiveness of Headquarters

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мирноград
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction is critically difficult, requiring balanced and systematic decisions by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Over the past seven days, the enemy has advanced 6 km in the direction of Myrnohrad - Pokrovsk.

Over the past seven days, the enemy has advanced 6 km in the direction of Myrnohrad - Pokrovsk. Despite them being on a narrow front with flanks being shot through, they’re advancements nonetheless.

Myrnohrad is 14 km away. Just 14. Myrnohrad is within range of long-range artillery fire. If the enemy is allowed to enter Mirnohrad, they get a zone of concentration and accumulation, and will be able to attack Pokrovsk itself. The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is the last area of ​​defense before the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy is very close, and, as the pace of the enemy's advance is alarming, the situation is critical.

According to the commanders and soldiers who defend the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd region, the main problem in the conditions of intensive operations is primarily the management and organization of such actions.

The Russian command attacks primarily those brigades that have the weakest management and organization, weak control and coordination. That is, the enemy is not looking for and pushing through the most vulnerable lines of defense, but the most vulnerable units and formations.

When a weakly led brigade is attacked, it cannot barely hold a narrow line.

Therefore, all marching reinforcements and reserves go to strengthen weak units that bear the greatest losses.

This does not allow for the creation of significant tactical reserves, which would have time for additional training and could carry out rotations of fighters more often, as well as equip the second and third lines of defense.

The lack of prepared positions for defense and reliable fortifications of structures occupied by troops does not allow for stopping the enemy at any border. An endless counter-battle with encapsulation during the offensive continues.

The Russians advance in a patterned and predictable manner. The Russians carry out frontal attacks of small groups of infantry with great losses, the enemy's advance is very difficult, they also send everyone they can into battle, their companies are exhausted to the last man. The main axis of attack is along the railway track. It is convenient to hide there and disguise yourself in landings. Everyone understands this, but engineering means have yet to turn this route into an impassable one.

A critical problem is the lack of unified, competent leadership for all drone forces and EW assets, which continue to be deployed in a scattered and uncoordinated manner. Our own EW destroys a significant number of our own drones. Drone units are assigned tasks without regard to tactical and technical capabilities.

I cannot say that the Ukrainian command does not see and does not understand the criticality of the situation. A lot is being done and none of the commanders sit idly by. Commander-in-Chief O. Syrsky pays personal attention.

But our reactions are clearly delayed despite the enemy’s plans being obvious and well known to us, with our intelligence providing a clear picture of possible next steps.

The direction lacks coordinated brigade headquarters, the logic of the use of troops and ammunition. Assigning tasks to weak headquarters of weakly organized brigades ignores the real combat capability of the troops, and this practice is sharply criticized in the troops. Brigade headquarters are a key element of combat capability.

Attempts to pull a bunch of subdivisions onto a given area does not produce an effect if there is no single clear logic of application.

The situation requires focusing on the direction of at least one brigade with a high-quality headquarters that will be able to establish combat management of disparate units in the area of ​​the breakthrough and reserve support for the brigades holding the flanks of the enemy's breakthrough to Myrnohrad.

Why do inexperienced brigade commanders and weak brigade staff continue to lead at a time when the command of the Ground Forces keeps dozens of experienced commanders with reputations earned in difficult battles in 2022-23 in the reserves? How can one rationalize it? Why is the personnel problem not solved despite everyone seeing it as the main issue and us having access to plenty of experienced personnel?

We need systemic solutions, we need to stop deceiving ourselves, we need measures that will be favorably supported by competent commanders of brigades and battalions in a given area, and the chain of command needs to be urgently strengthened.

Yuriy Butusov, Censor.NET