Yurii Butusov: Russia’s defeat in Syria shows that Ukraine needs to develop long-term war strategy
During a live broadcast, Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov analyzed the preconditions and consequences of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Russia’s loss of Syria and what changes in the war in Ukraine this could lead to.
An event that happened quickly and unexpectedly, but is very significant in modern world history. Today (8 December 2024 - ed.), the regime that is considered the most important in the world, the Assad regime in Syria, has officially ended. And Russia has suffered a heavy defeat in Syria. Russia has lost the war in Syria, which it waged directly for 10 years, and has lost the Assad regime, which supported the Soviet Union and Russia, was the conductor of Soviet and Russian influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean for 54 years.
It is necessary to assess this, because the events in Syria are very important for understanding the future and the Ukrainian strategy in the war that is taking place in Ukraine.
So, first of all. Just two weeks ago, there was a sudden offensive by Syrian forces controlled by Turkey, pro-Turkish units that were in the province of Idlib and were creating a sanitary zone along Turkey's borders. At the same time, there were attacks on the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad from the south, from Jordan, and from the east, where the United States troops and Kurdish and Arab tribes controlled by the United States are located. And as a result, in just two weeks, Assad fled.
Today (8.12.2024 - ed.) was the last day that Syrian state television was on, with a splash screen and everything dedicated to the Assad. And today, according to Russia, Bashar al-Assad was granted political asylum in Moscow. Another Syrian Yanukovych is now being held in this museum of dictators, which is gradually being moved to Rublevka near Moscow. And this event is very symbolic for us, showing the ineffectiveness and failure of Russian policy. And the fact that Russia is very weak, Russia can concentrate its forces for a short period of time, but Russia will lose in a long confrontation. And what has happened in Syria - the sudden fall of the regime - when Assad actually controlled all the intelligence services, the army, had support on the territory of Syria, the part controlled by Assad, there were Iranian and Russian troops, the Russian military contingent, several thousand soldiers, aviation, precision weapons, drones, armoured vehicles, artillery, special operations forces, all of this was there, on the ground. They were unable to stop the offensive of the actual guerrilla units in pickup trucks, which had a minimal amount of modern weapons. The Assad regime suffered a complete fiasco.
I would like to remind you that in 2017, Putin declared victory over terrorists in Syria, that Russia had managed to win the war and ensured stability there. In reality, it was not the case. It turned out that Russia was unable to take control of the whole of Syria, and enclaves were formed in a large part of the territory, one of which was controlled by Turkey and one by the United States Armed Forces. As a result, the Syrian Assad regime could not control the entire territory of the country and there were constant conflicts because of this, the government was weak, but Putin always said: "We support you". Russia provided security forces, financial support, and thus, thanks to ties with Moscow, the Assad regime continued to exist. It was completely dependent on Putin and on Iran, Russia's ally. Therefore, for a long time, Assad's Syria was under sanctions, it was unable to pursue any policy on its own, there were a large number of refugees, sanctions did not give the country any opportunity for development at all, and internal and economic problems only deepened. But there was Putin, and Putin said: "We are here, we support you". Russia was getting its military bases in Syria. This had been going on for a long time, since Soviet times. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, Russia's ships in the Mediterranean, all of this existed because the Syrian bases of Tartus and Latakia were convenient. Russia also set up the airbase and operated throughout Syria as its bridgehead in the Middle East. Now all this has collapsed instantly.
The Russian army was unable to repel the guerrilla attack, unable to stop the offensive, and simply collapsed instantly. And now Bashar al-Assad is in Moscow. This happened coincidentally on the 30th anniversary of the Belovezha Accords - 30 years ago, an agreement was signed on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it happened in Belarus. Back then, an agreement was signed that the post-Soviet republics would separate and become independent states, each of these states would respect the rights and borders of the other. And Russia broke that agreement almost immediately - Russia unleashed wars in Georgia and Moldova instantly. And now, as a result, in Ukraine. That is, almost wherever there is Russia, Russian influence, any Russian agreements, any Russian guarantees, Russia itself violates all its obligations, never fulfills them. And it leaves behind a complete decline. Bashar al-Assad also made a catastrophic mistake for him. Putin's support, Russia's support, turned out to be a disaster for this regime. That is, instead of helping Syria's development, Putin decided to strengthen Assad and keep him in office simply with Russian bayonets and the Russian army. And Russian planes began to kill even more Syrians than the troops and forces under Assad's control. They bombed even more cities, destroyed even more villages, killed even more Syrian civilians. And they made it basically impossible for any reconciliation, any harmony in Syria, any compromise. Because Putin invaded there.
Why was Putin there? Syria is not only a political outpost of Russia's influence in the Middle East. Because from Syria, Russia had influence on Turkey directly, and on Israel, and on all other countries, Iraq. Syria is an important foothold for Russia's political and military influence in the Middle East. It has been until now.
And of course, there were major conflicts between the Assad regime and Turkey. From the very beginning, these problems in Syria were caused by the fact that Assad had hostile relations with almost most of his neighbours. Relations with Israel were particularly hostile, but also with Turkey. In fact, Syria under Bashar al-Assad and Hafez al-Assad, his deceased father, was a dictator who ruled for 30 years, Hafez al-Assad from 1970 to 2000, and Bashar al-Assad, who ruled from 2000 to the present day, for 24 years. In other words, the Assads actually turned their country into a military foothold where Russia, the USSR and Iran waged war against the surrounding countries and created constant conflicts on the borders. It was very convenient to use Syria as a proxy army, as a springboard for undeclared wars. But in the end, everything turned against Putin and the Iranian ayatollahs.
It's terror, it's military and police special services that are just destroying everything around them and the task is simply to put down any people who protest, who disagree, who don't respect the government, a government that is based on terror and on complete corruption, incompetence and inefficiency. So Putin decided to put it on hold.
The war in Ukraine, unfortunately, continues, and Russia is much closer to us, but Russia had the same methodology in Syria. Nine years of continuous war. Before that, in fact, Russia entered Syria in 2013. Mercenary groups had already been sent there to help Assad, and they were engaged in combat operations. And for 9 years, the Russian army has been fighting in Syria. All of this has been in vain, because Russia is unable to offer any other model of development besides terror, military terror. Russia, like the Soviet Union in its time, can only export its model of state governance, which is based on terror, suppression, and special services that simply have tsarist powers and can destroy anyone and anything. Such terror in Syria has provoked desperate resistance, and almost all communities in the country are now united against Assad. And it is very significant that today anti-Assad rebels have emerged even in the province of Latakia, near the sea, where Russian bases are located - Khmeimim, Tartus, Latakia - and there are already rebels around these bases, and this province has always been populated by supporters of the Assad clan, the Alawites, a religious community, and they have always been the support of the Assad regime and this was the center of support for Assad in Syria. And today we see that even most of the Alawites have actually opposed Assad's actions, and this is what we see in the videos and messages that are sent by Russian Z-channels that have contacts in Syria.
So, the regime has collapsed completely, and we see that this is a continuing chain of political defeats for Russia. Russia enters somewhere with all the resources, all the power, gains political influence, takes control of the country, but then loses at a long distance. In other words, Russia's strength lies in the fact that, as a totalitarian state, it can concentrate its power exclusively on achieving some very short-term goals. Russia cannot build a new life. They can only build military bases, some kind of communication system to ensure that all military bases work, but they are not able to build an effective state model. And this is the example of Syria.
On Putin's latest political defeat
Again, Moscow will say "we were tricked", "we've been taken for a ride", all the usual Russian rhetoric when they lose somewhere. For example, in 2020, Armenia, which was under Russian control and was a military and political ally of Russia, was part of a collective security agreement organization that Russia created to strengthen its influence in post-Soviet countries. And so the Armenian political elite trusted Russia. What happened? Putin simply discarded them. He refused any support, and now, according to Armenian politicians, he did not even supply Armenia with the weapons they had paid for during the war. Now Armenia is de facto pulling out of the collective security agreement, as they realize it is impossible to trust Putin. He will never honor his commitments. For Putin and for Russia, obligations are just bargaining chips, mere pretexts for betrayal. Russia will always betray. This is exactly how they are betraying now. We are seeing videos from Syria, where Assad’s supporters, and those loyal to Russia, are being gunned down in the streets. There are cases where corpses of people tied to the Assad regime, who supported Russia, now lie in the streets, abandoned on the roads. Russia has forsaken them.
It is interesting that a few years after the Americans themselves left Afghanistan, without any offensives, the Russians showed these images of Afghans, and others who supported America or were against the Taliban, trying to escape, these were horrific images, and Russian propaganda showed, look, to what America leads, America is not able to protect anyone. However, I want to say, the Soviet Union in 1989, in principle, was withdrawing from Afghanistan in the same way and lost its influence very quickly. And the president that the Soviet Union appointed in Afghanistan at that time was simply shot and killed in the Afghan capital of Kabul. And all Soviet influence was completely destroyed. So, Russia was trying to show that the events in Afghanistan were just a disaster for America, that America was not able to control anything.
But Russia itself has forsaken its supporters in Syria. Moreover, according to Russian Z-channels, several Russian units have remained blockaded, surrounded and far from the coast. They are in the eastern part of Syria. They are now dependent on the goodwill of Turkey and the United States to be released and allowed to return home. In other words, Russia is not even able to evacuate its own soldiers from Syria on its own. What can we say about its own citizens? Yesterday, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a statement that it was offering Russian citizens to leave Syria. Of course, they will not have time to do so. Russia has forsaken its soldiers, forsaken its citizens. But, most importantly, all those tens of thousands of Syrians who were the backbone of the Assad regime, who believed in Russia, who believed that Putin would kill all those who were dissatisfied, that we would have a stable government here, they were forsook as well. And now all these people who were mocking, torturing their own citizens, killing, bombing, shelling their own towns and villages, now the opposition, that is, the pro-Turkish and pro-American units that will come to power, they will now be administering justice on this territory. I think that there will be a lot of blood, debts to be repaid by those who followed Assad's orders and were allies of Russia and Iran. Those who tarnished themselves with crimes because they thought that Russia was such a powerful state, that it would guarantee and protect everything there forever, that they could wreak havoc because Russia would cover them. No, Russia did not evacuate anyone from Syria, they did not even manage to evacuate their soldiers. Those who were carrying placards at Putin's demonstrations and who helped the Russian army will now be held accountable.
We see that Russia is actually losing its influence to Turkey. In the Caucasus, thanks to Turkey's support, Azerbaijan won the Karabakh war. Armenia is moving away from Russia, because Russia refused to guarantee the security of Armenia, which was its loyal ally. Now Turkey has completely drove Russia out of Syria, just thrown the Russian army out. They are now preparing to evacuate their military bases. And this will happen in the near future. And a situation is emerging where we see that Russia is not able to keep its obligations as an ally. And they will now concentrate their forces in Ukraine.
Why did they retreat from Syria? The newly elected winner of the US presidential election, Donald Trump, said that he made a post yesterday that Russia is indeed leaving Syria because Russia has lost 600,000 soldiers in Ukraine. And I think that this figure is, in principle, close to reality, if we count not only the killed but also the seriously wounded Russian soldiers who are out of service. That is why the war in which Putin has engaged in in Ukraine has made Russia simply weak and incapacitated in all other theatres of war. Russia can no longer concentrate its resources. All of Russia's resources are being absorbed by the war against Ukraine. What will this situation lead to?
Ukraine must have a long-term strategy
I think we can win the war with Russia only if we have a long-term strategy. Because Russia does not have the ability to wage confrontation for a long time. And all the modern wars, the long ones that Russia is waging, such as Afghanistan and Syria, show that Russia always loses in the long run. And where it faces resistance and sees the impossibility of resolving the situation exclusively by military means, Russia begins to withdraw. And sometimes it starts to run away. Therefore, for Ukraine, this lesson is, first of all, a demonstration for everyone who thinks that Russia is capable of restoring order somewhere.
Let's look at what happened to Syria. The Assads ruled Syria for 54 years. Until Putin began to actively help by bombing and destroying Syrian cities and Syrian villages, no one could have predicted such a catastrophe for Assad. In 2021, Assad rigged a result in the elections, according to Putin's experience, of 95% of the vote. And he thought that he would be there for a long time. But Putin's model is absolutely not viable. That is why I want to say once again that Ukraine needs a strategy that would adapt us, that would radically reduce the number of our losses. This can only be done if a strategic defense line is built in all directions. A deep line that protects our people at the front as much as possible, disguises their movements, disguises people and equipment, and allows them to maneuver covertly in defense. Only then can we truly stabilize the front line, realize our advantage in motivation, in the intelligence of our people. The military should use the latest technologies to destroy the Russian army. And then, in a long-lasting confrontation, over a long distance, Russia will definitely lose the war in Ukraine. Ukraine is a priority for Russia. They cannot withdraw from it so easily. But this war is also very burdensome for Russia. Russia is not flexible. Russia cannot adapt quickly. And an example of this is the events in Syria, where Putin has repeatedly declared victory in the war and lost the war completely. That is, after 9 years of statements that we have won, how they celebrated the capture of Palmyra, where 5,000 people remained, they celebrated it with such pomp, they sent an orchestra there. We suffered such losses. In addition to several hundred Russian soldiers and Wagner's mercenaries, according to various estimates, up to 500, perhaps 600 of them were killed. But also before Russia's losses, there were non-combat losses, a plane crashed with a full Russian military ensemble, there were a large number of accidents, a large number of Russian equipment, aircraft were destroyed in various accidents. One of the Russian planes was shot down by a Syrian missile, and terrorists affiliated with the Syrians also destroyed a Russian passenger plane with all the people, civilians. And this was a war where Russia suffered heavy losses, huge material losses, invested everything in it and failed.
Therefore, the main conclusion of these events is that we will not be able to find quick solutions and overcome Russia's advantage very quickly. But if Ukraine changes its strategy, finally builds it, and we can concentrate on what we need most - stopping the enemy at the front, and we have the people and forces to do that right now, we have the ammunition, then we will be in a strong position after Trump comes to power, after Putin tries to use military force for the time being, after Trump comes to power, after Putin tries to decide the fate of this war for Ukraine's independence by military force more than once, and we need to concentrate all our efforts on ensuring that the enemy cannot achieve any more quick results in this war. We need to stop Putin, and then he will definitely lose in the long run, just as he lost in Syria.
Answers to questions
Do you think the news about Assad's surrender, escape and death is a circus or a reality?
I haven't seen any confirmation that Assad is dead, but the Russians have said that they have given him asylum in Russia, and I think that's true. In principle, Assad's fate is now important only to Putin. It's like the Syrian Yanukovych to Yanukovych. They now have to have dinner together in Moscow, spend time and talk to Putin, so that he can look at them all the time and think about what awaits him. This is such a good reminder to Putin, to Moscow. In 2021, 95% support in the Syrian presidential election. 78% voter turnout. Very high numbers. Everyone supported. There are portraits everywhere, everybody loves Assad. And it fell apart without resistance, just like a house of cards.
Will the fall of the Assad dynasty lead to an increase in the intensity of hostilities on our territory?
I don't think this will change. In fact, we see that there are several thousand Russian servicemen in Syria, but a significant number of them are air base personnel and naval base personnel. In other words, these are people who ensure the operation of primarily infrastructure facilities. We see that the Russians have been operating there with a small number of combat units. Most of them were concentrated in Ukraine. In particular, the special forces brigades, the marine brigade that were constantly there, they are now all fighting in full force in Ukraine and in the Kursk region. That's why I don't think it will increase anything. We see that the number of weapons that Russia used there, well, the main thing is ammunition. I don't think there are many stocks left there now, because Russia is unlikely to withdraw most of its reserves from Syria. All of it will remain there. The current focus is simply on evacuating the most valuable military equipment and personnel. They need to do it quickly because Russia was not prepared for this, and it came as a surprise to them. They won’t be able to physically take out all their reserves, weapons, and supplies — not all of them, not even most of them, or even a significant part of them. Everything that has been established there and everything that Russia brought in will largely stay behind. Discussions on Russian channels suggest that the withdrawal could happen in the near future. Therefore, I don't think this will significantly affect the intensity of fighting in Ukraine. Russia already has far greater forces engaged here, and there are no contingents in Syria that surpass the scale of what Russia has deployed in Ukraine. What remains in Syria could perhaps reinforce a few divisions in certain sectors of the front, but no more than that.
Could Israel have shot down Assad's plane?
So far, there is no evidence that it was shot down. How much does this affect our front? Well, it's up to us to decide what impact Putin's defeat in Syria will have on our front. Will we, Ukraine, use this situation or not? Now the whole world has seen that Putin is weak. Putin cannot resolve the situation in Syria because he lacks the resources to do so. Putin does not know how to play the long game. How can we use this? If Ukraine builds an adequate defense line now, not the way it is now, there will be chaos at the front, chaos at the top, in Kyiv, chaos there. And at the front, there is a reaction, people are fighting the way they do in Kyiv, but the necessary decisions are not actually being made on the situation at the front, on the proper use of troops, on the training of troops. And it is extremely difficult for the troops without a solid centralized command from above.
War is not like Maidan. Ukrainians excel in tactics, motivation, and improvisation, but war is a struggle of systems. We need systemic solutions and the ability to scale successful practices. For this, we require decisions from the top, but they are currently lacking. This is why public pressure is essential to push Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, and Oleksandr Syrskyi to move beyond words and actually write down a plan, even on paper. This is why public pressure is necessary, so that Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff, and Oleksandr Syrskyi, not just in words but in actions, put their plans down on paper—at least ask the people on the front lines, brigade and battalion commanders, what defense means right now, how it should be structured, what lines it should be anchored to, how to factor in drones, destruction, intelligence, how to organize troop maneuvers in defense, and account for the impact of military equipment and personnel. All of this needs to be done, and it’s entirely feasible. Then we will stop Putin. Then we can say: Ukraine has taken advantage of the situation. And only then will we negotiate with the Western world and the U.S. for our support, for additional financial and military assistance. Not as weak people begging, ‘Save us, give us another billion, or everything will collapse,’ but as people who have already achieved concrete results and whom Putin cannot defeat. That is a much more effective and powerful negotiating position.
How do Zelenskyy and Yermak not understand this? Or do they not want to understand? It's just strange, to be honest. Or it raises questions about their motivation in the war. Do they want to play roles there, perform somewhere, shine next to Trump, just take pictures, be on video? Or do they want to save Ukrainians from death and win the war? Sometimes it seems that acting is the only motivation they have in life.
Will there be a scenario like in Afghanistan? Does the new force have a chance for democracy?
I don't think we can talk about any kind of democracy in a country where such a heavy war has been going on for so many years, where there are so many interests of different countries, so many conflicts. This will not happen quickly. I don't think democracy is possible everywhere. In order for a society to live democratically and build a democratic system, there are a significant number of requirements that must be implemented in society and in the state. But I'm sure now that after this dictatorial, bloody nightmare that Assad has created, there will certainly be more compromises and freedoms in Syria.
Is a similar situation possible in Ukraine on both sides?
I do not think that the scenario that was implemented in Syria is possible in Ukraine at the moment. Neither on one side nor the other. There are no prerequisites. Now, in fact, there is a certain positional stalemate in the war. There is no stable frontline, but the concentration of drones and precision weapons on both sides makes deep offensive operations impossible. And there is no collapse of combat capability, no loss of combat capability on either side of the front.
In order to weaken the Russians and create conditions for a repeat of the 2022 Balakliia breakthrough, it is necessary to undermine the combat effectiveness of Russian troops. It was precisely due to the loss of combat capability, the complete depletion of reserves, the weakening of Russian forces, and the thinning of their combat formations that Ukrainian strikes and offensive operations succeeded. However, in areas like Kherson, where it was not possible to breach the battle lines and dismantle the Russian defence, attempts to achieve a breakthrough—such as those made in September and October 2022—also failed. It is crucial to understand that for such achievements—large-scale offensives and deep breakthroughs like those currently observed in Syria—the conditions must be carefully prepared. Syrian troops had lost their combat capability well before the offensive began. Similarly, Russian and Iranian troops, now entangled in the war with Israel in Lebanon, had suffered significant losses in combat capability earlier. The success of these operations was made possible by carefully timing the offensive, leading to lightning-fast and unexpected victories, surprising not only observers but also Russia and Iran, which position themselves as superpowers.
After Syria, what other areas of Russian influence can Russia lose in this way?
The main thing we are fighting for is Ukraine. Everything else, to be honest, doesn't really interest me. And I am talking about Syria itself today only because it is a demonstration of our strategy. What does the war and the fight against Russia look like from the perspective of, for example, another hot spot? How likely is it that other states will follow Syria's example?
Please comment on Trump's words that we have lost about 400,000 soldiers and civilians.
Trump said that Russia lost 600,000 soldiers in Ukraine and that Ukraine lost 400,000. I think that, of course, an assessment of our losses, since we know almost everything about them, is possible if we count the total losses in the war as a whole. What are these losses? These are the dead, as I said in the last broadcast, the number of dead in the Armed Forces is now officially recognized as 70,000, and, according to sources in the General Staff, 35 Ukrainian heroes are unfortunately missing. And we also have losses of seriously wounded, losses of people who have lost their health, because the war has been going on for three years, and a large number of people are being discharged, and there are also a large number of diseases. There are lightly wounded people who are out of action, and they are recorded as sanitary losses, but then some of these people return to the army again. There are also a large number of such people. Therefore, I think that the figure of 400 thousand is what Trump meant, of course, in terms of the total number of Ukrainian losses.
Similarly, I think that Russia's losses are 600,000 in total, and even our General Staff's estimate is more accurate, with 700,000 Russian losses. I think that simply not all of these 700,000, 600-700,000, are dead. A study of obituaries published in Russian social media, plus data on the losses of the Wagner PMC, plus estimated losses of mobilised former Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories where Russia conducted forced mobilisation in early 2022. That is, if you count all this, then the Russian figures for those killed in this war from all components, personally, what I see, is now up to about 200,000. And about 200,000 killed, but they also have a huge number of people who have been discharged from the army. That is, the armed forces, a huge number of wounded, seriously wounded, a huge number of people who have been out of the army for a long period of time because of injuries, illnesses, or discharged from the army. War is very hard for everyone. And since Russia has had a significant numerical advantage over Ukraine from the very beginning of the war, and Russia has been advancing for a long time, and Russian generals always treat their people, their soldiers, as disposable, sent in one direction, and they cannot return, because they will simply be shot on the spot, then, of course, Russia's losses in such conditions are much greater. Of course, we can see this on the Internet. Now, on each side, Russia and Ukraine, most of the losses are recorded by drones, and we can see that the number of drone strikes, the number of Russians killed, if we analyse the main telegram channels, is much higher than Ukraine's losses at the front. That's why the losses are high, it's not to say that Ukraine's losses are small, they are high, but Russia is losing much more, in my estimation, at least twice the losses of the Russian Federation, irreversible. This is what I can see from the analysis of social media, from the fragmentary data of estimated losses that I have available to me. It is quite possible that Russia's losses are much higher. I do not yet have the basis for analysis to draw such conclusions. I have respect for the General Staff's data because, overall, I believe that the scale of losses, when accounting for all types of Russian losses, including non-combat casualties, is roughly as reported by the General Staff. It might even be slightly higher. In Russia, these losses simply don't get acknowledged as quickly.
I would like to remind you that the population of the Russian Federation, the mobilization resource, is at least five times higher than the Ukrainian one. So, of course, what is difficult for us is that Russia, with its repressive apparatus, can conscript a much larger number of people into the army. In Russia, there is no conscription because no one records it. The police come and pack you up.
There, the AWOL is a phenomenon that Russians do not announce, because there is a real hunt for these AWOLs in Russia. Most of those who went AWOL escape from the army, then they are returned and sent to punitive assault units. On top of that, you need to understand that Russia has a large number of depressed regions where the average salary is $300. And this is not something people get somewhere, even in the countryside, where they can engage in agriculture, but in the Far East, where the cost of living is much higher than what you can earn. That's why people are running away from this hopelessness, from the Russian depression, from Russian lawlessness. It's easy for them to use anything to recruit for money into the army. The salary in the army in Russia, and the bonus that Russians give, which is now 3 million rubles, is space money for Russia, which 99% of Russians will never be able to earn in Russia in any way. So, of course, they recruit those marginalised people, homeless people, convicts, the unemployed or low-income people who have some loans, some problems in their lives. And then they turn these people very quickly into cannon fodder by shooting them on the spot.
What do you think of the meeting between Zelenskyy, Trump and Macron? What do you think?
I don't think anything. These are protocol things, diplomacy. We need to evaluate the results. The question is what it leads to. Everyone can meet. Yanukovych used to meet with them here. And it did not always end well for us. So let's see what happens. We will evaluate not ceremonies and protocols, but real events.
Why didn't Russia intervene?
Because Russia is being beaten by the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian army is simply destroying the Russian occupiers. And all of Russia's resources, up to 50% of the Russian budget, is now being used to finance the war with Ukraine. Yes, Oreshnik did not help.
Could you please tell us why the TDF (Territorial Defense Forces) is needed almost three years into the war? Wouldn't it have been better to disband all the TDF battalions and transfer the soldiers to military brigades?
In my opinion, we have never had a proper doctrine for the TDF. However, practice shows that the TDF is still critically needed today. There is a pressing need for a military contingent to combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups and to reinforce units responsible for protecting the state border. These tasks were supposed to be carried out by the National Guard, but currently, its combat-ready units and brigades are deployed at the front. Therefore, we absolutely need reserve formations to enhance our security and defence in areas where there are no large-scale, high-intensity battles involving regular armed forces. Ukraine needs the TDF right now. We must strengthen border security and have reserves capable of protecting strategic facilities like bridges and power grids. This requires a military structure in place that is equipped and specialised in these tasks.
And a very urgent need in the war is air defence, anti-drone defence. A huge number of drones are being shot down and can be shot down and hit from the ground. Not only by anti-aircraft guns, but also by crews of FPV drone operators . Who can do this? Well, the best way is for the territorial defence troops to do it, who are at home, who are in control of the territory, and they solve all these issues of local and civil defence, help in eliminating the consequences of all Russian strikes, because they are close to cities.
In fact, the TDF is a very correct and necessary doctrine. But our TDF forces are subordinated to the Ground Forces Command. That is, instead of independent tasks, important tasks that the TDF should perform at home, we have turned it into a reserve of the third stage of the ground forces. That is why it is used exclusively as an appendage to the ground forces. And then the question really arises - what if it is an appendage to the ground forces? Why does the military command use unarmed TDF brigades as ground troops? I was just surprised. We have sections of the frontline where a TDF brigade, the TDF brigade headquarters, is in charge of several military formations of the Armed Forces, i.e. ground troops, mechanised battalions, and assault battalions. They were not created or equipped for this before. The question arises - why do we have such a huge number of brigades deployed at the front? Do we have headquarters in trenches and plantations? We have created a huge number of brigades, a huge number of battalions that are not needed at the front, which should be performing tasks in the rear, in their regions. But they are not performing them.
In fact, the TDF represent a very sound and necessary doctrine. However, in our case, the TDF is subordinated to the Ground Forces Command. This means that instead of performing independent and important tasks in their respective regions, the TDF has been turned into a third-tier reserve for the ground forces. As a result, it is used solely as an auxiliary component of the regular army. This raises a valid question: if the TDF is merely a subordinate component to the ground forces, why does the military command deploy under-equipped TDF brigades as frontline troops? I was genuinely surprised to see sections of the frontline where a TDF brigade and its headquarters are tasked with commanding several military formations of the Armed Forces, including mechanized and assault battalions. These brigades were neither designed nor staffed for such operations. The bigger question is why we have deployed so many brigades to the front. Are headquarters supposed to operate from trenches and tree lines? We've created an excessive number of brigades and battalions, many of which are unnecessary at the frontline. These units should be fulfilling tasks in the rear, within their regions. But they are not.
The problem with the organisation and use of troops is not only with the TDF. Of course, it would be wise to keep the TDF as an organised structure in the rear, which is engaged in systematic recruitment, conscription, training of people, young people who have to go to the army, who can be called up immediately, mobilised. It helps fight drones, organises air defence, organises security. There are a lot of tasks for the TDF. Therefore, of course, the TDF can allocate and prepare marching units for recruitment, separate companies that are specially trained to replenish or rotate combat units for a certain period of time, for example, there is a TDF brigade in the region and a mechanised brigade of ground troops there. They are very often close to each other or even use the same training ground. And it would be logical that these TDF brigades could transfer for some time the personnel of the unit with which they cooperate, where there is coherence, a common organisation, commanders know each other, and for some time transfer separate companies to operate as part of combat units. This would be a reasonable way. But Ukraine has chosen a different path, where everyone is fighting.
What can we say about TDFs when we have brigades of the State Transport Service being used at the front. Like infantry. Everybody goes forward. If you are a brigade or a regiment or a battalion, you all have to be infantry. Why is this necessary? The leadership does not know.
In fact, we have a complete chaos in management, and therefore, instead of organising a unified system of using fire and reconnaissance assets at the front, a unified organisational structure, putting brigades on a certain section of the front and deploying these brigades in divisions so that they simply stay in their area and do not change, and simply replenish them with infantry, replenish them with the right people, give them the opportunity to rotate, it would be effective. But no one in Ukraine plans, organises or acts in this way, because we have no military war planning and no war strategy. The TDF is just one example of the lack of strategies, and the leaders do not know what to do. First, they send all the TDFs to the front, then problems arise that some subversive group has entered some territory. Then there are problems with drones flying around and no one to shoot them down. Of course, all the TDFs were sent to the front. Who else is going to do it? The National Guard was sent to the front, the TDFs were sent to the front, then some units were brought back from the front and given the task of organising some work in the rear. It's a complete chaos. That's why I'm talking about strategy.
We are weak organizationally. Russia has the advantage in terms of numbers of people, equipment, ammunition, and organization. They are continuing this offensive due to a more systematic organization. The numbers alone would not have worked. They had a numerical advantage in 2022 as well. The overall advantage in numbers has always been on Russia's side. Always. From the first day of the war. While we were mobilizing people, their professional army was already advancing. That is, in every part of the frontline where they were advancing, they had a significant advantage in numbers. But it didn't work because, at that time, Ukraine had the organizational and managerial advantage. Now we have lost this advantage. In this stable positional war at the front, we have now lost it. And we need to regain this advantage. For this, we need a strategy. The TDF should focus on TDF tasks, not on holding frontline sections with TDF brigades and battalions. This is absurd. If these battalions and brigades were equipped with weapons and staffed with competent, qualified command personnel, I would understand this. Perhaps some TDF battalions are truly combat-ready, on par with the ground forces. But there are very few of them. So there is no need to engage in these practices. People survive where they have support, command, control, reconnaissance, and firepower. It’s not just about saying, "Let’s put someone else on these frontline areas." Who? The TDF? This is an approach that leads to significant losses.
Therefore, this question is precisely about strategy. What will happen to us, to our war, after Russia's defeat in Syria, is primarily up to us. It is on our frontline, and its stabilisation depends on us. Not on Trump, not on Syria, not on Putin. Stabilising our frontline is about building a strategic defence. This is exclusively our task, our challenge. No one else will do it, no one else will force the generals and Zelenskyy to make the right decisions. This can only be done through the pressure of public opinion. That's why, in principle, I am talking to you and I am very grateful to all 2,600 sponsors of the Butusov Plus channel who help us work and see you regularly.
Dear friends, thank you for the broadcast on this important day in modern history. Thank you for the broadcast and Glory to Ukraine!
