Author:  Yurii Butusov

Butusov on results of year at front and internal challenges

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Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov’s stream is dedicated to the results of the military year: what happened in the war, the main results and losses in the war.

What exactly is happening on the front line now

The map illustrates the year’s outcomes regarding territorial changes and hostilities, as well as how the frontline territories have shifted over the past year. The Ukrainian Defense Forces liberated approximately 553 square kilometers over the course of the year. I emphasize that these numbers reflect the results of combat operations throughout the year, not just the overall change in the situation during this period. At present, the most significant achievement includes territories that remain under Ukraine’s control, such as a 498-square-kilometer buffer zone in the Kursk region. Progress has also been made near Kharkiv, Vovchansk, and several other sections of the frontline. Altogether, this amounts to 553 square kilometers under Ukrainian control.

maps

What is under enemy control?

In 2024, Russian forces managed to seize substantial territories. This is considerably more than what they captured in 2023. By the end of the year, they had occupied 4,075 square kilometers, including 602 square kilometers in the Kursk region. Notably, they reclaimed parts of the territories that Ukraine had taken during the August Kursk offensive operation.

Unfortunately, the enemy captured 3,500 kilometers of Ukrainian land. The most critical situation is in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove direction. The enemy captured Vuhledar this year and advanced far from Vuhledar. The enemy captured Avdiivka and advanced far. This advance creates a great threat - the enemy is actually 7 kilometers from the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy has also launched an offensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia.

In the area of Orikhove, 55 square kilometers have been captured by the enemy. And the offensive continues. The enemy has advanced 267 square kilometers on the Oskil military line. The enemy has actually reached the Oskil River.

Both sides tried to seize the strategic initiative. To carry out deep offensive operations. On May 10, the enemy launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region, attacking along the border and seizing almost 200 square kilometers. In the Kharkiv region, in the area of Vovchansk and in the area towards Kharkiv. That is, the village of Lyptsi, the village of Hlyboke. At the moment, they have been partially driven out in some areas. The enemy still has about 180 square kilometers of captured land in these areas. The enemy's offensive in this area has been stopped. Defense forces are even conducting some counterattacks. The enemy is being driven out in some areas near Lyptsi.

Kursk region

The situation in the Kursk region as of December 31, 2024

Heavy fighting is taking place in the Kursk direction. On August 6, the Ukrainian army launched a surprise offensive in the Kursk region. The district center of Sudzha was taken under control. And a large area around it. The maximum advance was up to 1100 square kilometers. A  buffer zone on the border. At first, the enemy did not react to this offensive so actively. Reserves were being deployed there, but the enemy tried to limit the fighting there and use a limited number of its forces. Now, the Russians have concentrated forces in this area that are significantly superior. Elite Russian military units are now there: marines, special forces, airborne troops. In other words, the enemy is advancing in this direction, but with great difficulty. Obviously, they would like to drive the Ukrainians out of the Kursk region with all their might. But they are not succeeding. Our troops are fighting there with dignity and inflicting huge losses on the enemy. The most critical situation for the year is there.

Pokrovsk direction

In 2024, the enemy captured Avdiivka in this area, while Kurakhove is almost entirely under enemy control. Vuhledar has been completely captured. Smaller towns and numerous villages have also fallen to the enemy. Unfortunately, the enemy's advance in this direction spans 2,415 kilometers. This is particularly disheartening as this area previously held some of our strongest defensive lines. Due to the terrain, Avdiivka, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar were located on elevated ground. Additionally, the town of Hirnyk, the highest point in Donbas, is situated north of Kurakhove and was also captured by the enemy. These heights were highly advantageous for defense, providing excellent vantage points and radio horizons for the operation of our drones. However, the enemy has achieved its most significant advancement in this area.

The enemy now controls the majority of Toretsk, and half of Chasiv Yar is actually occupied. The enemy continues to advance, posing a serious threat. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to establish an effective defense in Pokrovsk. There is now a real risk of the cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad being captured, as they form a single agglomeration.

As you can see from the map, the enemy is trying to advance south of Pokrovsk, i.e. to do what they did at Kurakhove. They have advanced deeply along the flanks, securing the supply line, limiting the maneuver of our troops and improving their tactical position. This made a further effective defense of the Kurakhove area impossible. The enemy is doing the same here in Pokrovsk. The situation there is very difficult. If they succeed in capturing Pokrovsk, it will lead to very serious consequences. In fact, the enemy will then move to the borders with the  Dnipropetrovsk region and the center of the country. You and I understand that the enemy will not stop and will continue their offensive.

What can we say in general about the results of the year?

Unfortunately, the discussions about building a strategic defense, as highlighted by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi, remain merely discussions. We still lack a strategic defense system—not just in words but in practice. A proper strategic defense system requires interconnected defense lines with sufficient density to allow our troops to maneuver effectively during defense. Instead, we are equipping isolated positions that offer limited protection against artillery fire but are defenseless against drones. These positions fail to account for the realities of modern warfare and are not part of a cohesive defensive line. Furthermore, these positions are not preemptively reinforced with trained and deployed troops ready to fight there. As a result, we cannot establish a stronghold. The problems are clear—they are visible on the map.

However, what is encouraging about the results of the year? In all areas where our troops are standing firm, where there is effective command and control, and where drones are used effectively, the enemy is unable to break through.

Let us focus on the areas on the map where the enemy has made no advances throughout the year.

I would like to say that the enemy is trying to advance along most part of the frontline. In fact, there are very active hostilities from Huliaipole to Kupiansk. Separately, there are areas in the Kharkiv region, including Sudzha and now Lyptsi and Vovchansk. There are constant active hostilities there, the enemy is attacking actively. But he fails to break through in many areas.

Our soldiers have been defending this salient near Siversk for 2.5 years. In fact, they have held all the lines there, the Russian advance is insignificant, and the losses are huge. The enemy cannot advance. Similarly, the area above Siversk, the "Lyman" OTG (Operational -Tactical Group), we see the enemy's advance is insignificant, if we take the section from Svatove and below. The enemy managed to capture 108 square kilometers, but then at a distance from Borova, at the border of Borova, from the village of Makiivka and above, our defense line was set up and the enemy could not advance there. The losses are huge, assaults, assaults, assaults. That is why we see that there are sections of the frontline where the Russians are using large forces but are not successful. In each of these areas where the frontline is held, our soldiers are standing. It is only thanks to their heroism, skill, proper organization of troops, primarily the right decisions of the main line commanders, brigade commanders, battalion commanders, that the enemy is killed and stopped.

In other words, there are areas where the situation is critical, but there are areas where the enemy is not able to do anything. And our task, as civil society, is to analyze this and still demand political changes from the country's leadership. Changes, first and foremost, that would require the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which allocates resources, the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for supply, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who directly deploys troops, to ensure that the defense along the entire line of our front is built on the basis of the successful experience we have. That is, where there are results, these models of successful governance should be applied everywhere.

Unfortunately, it is with the scaling of the right experience, the right models that we have a major problem in 2024. And this is what allowed the enemy to advance. That is, the dramatic gap between tactical decisions, the capabilities of the troops and strategic planning, orders of the command at the strategic and operational level that exist in the Armed Forces, we, unfortunately, could not overcome it in 2024.

Well, I want to remind you that the plan was different. On February 8, 2024, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced a change in the leadership of the Armed Forces. Oleksandr Syrskyi was appointed instead of Valerii Zaluzhnyi. The main task was to stabilize the frontline. Unfortunately, as we can see from the map, this task has not been accomplished. Zelenskyy appointed Syrskyi, Zelenskyy set the task, and his task has not been fulfilled. We, civil society, do not have the opportunity to dismiss Zelenskyy, to dismiss Syrskyi, to dismiss Umierov. Obviously, these leaders who are responsible for the conduct of the war, first of all, they failed to fulfill this key task. Obviously, there are major shortcomings, and these shortcomings are on the map, shortcomings at the level of the country's top military and political leadership. But there are things that we do well in war, and we need to do them well.

And the country's leadership must draw conclusions from the results of 2024 so that it does not degenerate, as is often the case with the authorities, into mere PR: replacing an unpopular figure with a popular one. It is crucial for Volodymyr Zelenskyy to draw the right conclusions. The requirements and tasks he outlined in his February 8 decree and statement regarding what Syrskyi should do have proven insufficient to change the situation. There has been no stabilization of the front. The generals did not improve their understanding of the front. It is clear that the results demand a thorough reassessment. I hope that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Chief will analyze what did not work, make an after-action review of the year's results, analyze the problems and identify those commanders and those areas of the front where the enemy is being held, where the enemy suffers many times the losses. 

We have directions where the enemy is suffering losses 10, 12, even 15 times greater than ours. These are confirmed losses in killed, which we verify through video recordings. We are achieving such results. What we need is proper organization. The main concern, as voiced by every frontline commander I’ve spoken with, isn't about the number of personnel, ammunition, or drones. The core issue is inadequate decisions made by the command, where tasks are assigned that do not match the capabilities of the troops, the tactical situation, or the goal of neutralizing the enemy and preserving our own forces. This is the key issue on the front that requires urgent resolution so that we don’t face a continuous creeping enemy advance throughout 2025.

Enemy losses

We currently lack objective, verifiable data that is fully accounted for and accurately confirmed publicly. At this time, we can only rely on unofficial estimates, which do not fully encompass all the losses incurred during the war. Let’s take a look at the database of Russian military equipment losses. This data comes from the Oryx website. The Oryx portal is the only online accounting resource that tracks all available information, including media reports, photos, and videos from social networks, where the information is most reliably confirmed. I'm not claiming that this data is absolutely accurate, as obviously not all losses are captured on camera, not all are posted on social media, and not everything can be identified. Nevertheless, we can observe certain trends. These are the losses accounted for based on photos and videos with linked sources on the Oryx portal.

I believe the actual number of Russian losses is much higher, as the enemy is currently on the offensive and we are unable to take photos and videos of all the Russian equipment losses that are in front of us.

So, what has been recorded?

Russian losses according to Oryx for three years of war
Russian losses according to Oryx for three years of war
Russian losses according to Oryx for three years of war

As a result of almost three years of hostilities:

  • 3,662 Russian tanks have been destroyed;
  • 5,258 IFVs (armored fighting vehicles with cannons), including Russian APCs equipped with 30 mm automatic cannons—these are combat vehicles with heavy armaments;
  • 15,393 armored personnel carriers (both tracked and wheeled vehicles of various types), as well as other types of armored vehicles. The Russians have a large variety of vehicles, including numerous infantry vehicles;
  • command posts, communication stations, engineering vehicles and equipment;
  • importantly, we see self-propelled anti-tank missile systems listed here;
  • 129 artillery support and loading vehicles;
  • towed artillery, 419 Russian guns, all types, towed, not self-propelled;
  • 861 self-propelled artillery units;
  • multiple launch rocket systems;
  • air defense systems, air defense missile systems;
  • 134 aircraft;
  • 148 helicopters, almost all of them destroyed. There are only a dozen or so damaged ones listed here, and it remains to be seen how many of them they can actually restore,
  • 28 ships and boats, which is a significant number, and we know that even a Russian cruiser was destroyed.

These are Russian losses according to the Oryx portal.

I should note that Oryx also recorded Ukrainian losses, which are also significant.

Ukraine's losses

Ukraine has about 35% of the Russian losses, which means that our losses in equipment are about three times less. Although the Russians have a significant advantage in weapons and numbers, our losses in equipment are about three times less.

Втрати ЗСУ за три роки війни
Втрати ЗСУ за три роки війни
Втрати ЗСУ за три роки війни

  • The 1100 IFVs are about 5 times less than the Russians and then armored personnel carriers, we see losses of different classes further. We are using much more MPAPs, these are just trucks, armored vehicles;
  • 201 - losses of engineering equipment;
  • 229 - towed artillery, our losses in towed artillery are actually half of the enemy's;
  • 439 - self-propelled artillery, also half as much;
  • MLRS - 80, which is about 4 times less than the Russians lost;
  • air defense systems and anti-aircraft missiles - 166;
  • 102 airplanes damaged or destroyed;
  • 50 helicopters.
  • We have 41 ships and boats, but it should be noted that most of these vessels are very small full-load weight. Russia has lost a large number of other ships, even a submarine, and other landing craft.

So, these are the results.

This is a war, and therefore both sides do not publish their losses, so that it is not clear what real loss in combat capability the troops are suffering.

Losses of Russian and Ukrainian troops in the war

Losses of Russian troops

Let's look at the losses of Russian troops according to the most complete database. This is the Goryushko telegram channel. And it counts social media data, reports of deaths in social media, in Russian social media. And the Russian zet-channel Lost Armor counts data in social networks, that is, reports of the dead in Ukrainian social networks. We see that in fact, almost 90 thousand Russian soldiers, of all formations, have been eliminated in almost three years of war as of December 30. That is, these data actually show only confirmed losses.

I should note that, unlike Ukraine, Russia has very strict military censorship, and data on losses are not only classified but in many units there is a policy of classifying losses. And there are much fewer messages in Russian social networks, if we have a large number of messages, in Russia the percentage of what is posted on social networks is much smaller.

Losses of Ukrainian troops

According to the Russian Lost Armor, 60,547 citizens of Ukrainian soldiers and those who fought for Ukraine at all bases, including foreign volunteers, were killed. The Goryushko database does not include the dead citizens of other countries fighting for Russia, whom Russia hires, and there are no losses of those who were mobilized from the occupied territories. Citizens of Ukraine from Donbas who were mobilized by the Russians and thrown into battle from the occupied territories.

These figures show that the enemy's losses, according to open sources, are about one and a half times higher than Ukraine's losses. The enemy's losses in military equipment are three times higher than Ukraine's. Furthermore, the enemy's equipment is more expensive and more modern, as the Russians were preparing for the war.

We also see that there are significant losses in the number of missing persons. The data on missing persons is in the register of missing persons. This is information about 55 thousand people as of the beginning of October 2024. According to Censor.Net's sources close to the General Staff, at least 35 thousand people in this register are military personnel. Information about them is usually not made public on social media, and a large number of them are, of course, missing civilians, people whose fate we know nothing about. As for Russia, of course, there is no register of missing persons in Russia at all. And there is also only very fragmented data there. The only data we have is that Anna Tsivilova, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, mentioned at a press conference that 48,000 Russian families have applied to laboratories for DNA testing. 48,000 are only those relatives who have applied and taken DNA tests, this is not the entire database. There are hundreds of collective appeals on the Russian Internet, entire military units create committees of relatives of the deceased and publish appeals on the Internet because there is no database that has been opened in Russia where it is possible to verify the inclusion of a particular deceased in the database of missing persons. Therefore, Russians simply make demands to be found. We don't know the exact number of missing persons, it is obviously much higher because not everyone takes DNA tests, it is only a part of those who disappeared. And so, as far as the real number of missing persons in Russia is concerned, we do not have such up-to-date information.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, Russian losses amounted to about 750,000, I think it's up to 800,000. I think that maybe this includes all the losses, I don't think it's really just the dead, I don't see such dynamics on social media. We have seen more activity on social media, but in my opinion, Russian losses are not the 90,000 already identified in the samples, but these losses are many times greater. I think that the General Staff's data actually shows the numbers of those who Russia has actually lost, not only in terms of dead but also in terms of seriously wounded who have left military units. And in general, I think this figure is close to reality because if you look at the lists of mobilized people, at the lists, at the statements of the Russian Ministry of Defense on changes in the staffing of the armed forces, on the replenishment of the Russian army, we can see that according to various reports in 2022, according to the minimum figures, I will do a broadcast later and I will show you the figures and sources, Russia sent at least about a million of its military personnel to the war in Ukraine during 2022. In 2023, 540,000 servicemen were sent to replenish the active army, according to Defense Minister Shoigu. And during 2024, 427,000 servicemen were sent to the army, according to Defense Minister Belousov's statement at the Defense Ministry board in Moscow in December.

In total, if we count the numbers, over these almost three years, Russia has sent nearly 2 million servicemen to the war across all armed formations and branches, all of whom have been participated in combat operations. Of course, these figures reflect the minimum estimates recorded by Russian sources based on the statements we have. It is possible that the actual number exceeds 2 million.

We see that these are large numbers, and, according to Putin's statement, the number of Russian troops currently at the front is 614,000. This means that, after sending nearly 2 million to the front, according to minimal estimates, 614,000 are actively participating in the fighting, based on Putin’s statement. That is, we don't know what happened to the other 1,400,000, what their condition is, why they left the combat zone, how many of them were killed, how many of them are missing, how many are seriously wounded, sick, demobilized for one reason or another, or those who have returned and continue to serve, but for some reason on the territory of the Russian Federation itself. Russia has classified all of this data, so I will do a separate broadcast on Russian losses, and we will need to analyze all of this in detail. So, these are the sources and the results of the year in numbers.

Based on the results of the year, let's show the figures of losses of Russian officers, what is known from Russian public sources. According to the sources that are now available on the Internet, Russia has lost a minimum of 5324 officers, according to the minimum confirmed estimates. According to the Russian website, there are data on the deaths of 3,502 officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and various Ukrainian forces and defense forces. So, officers are the most classified column in the Russian Armed Forces, and the data on them is published very late, and the data is far from complete. We see that the ratio here is also the same in Russia, with much higher losses in the officer corps. And we see that there is also a small detail of Russian losses.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Was Pokrovsk prepared for urban battles in terms of fortifications? 

Some work has been done, but no serious preparations have been made to defend the city of Pokrovsk. Certain positions were dug near the city itself, but unfortunately, they did not form a defensive line—just isolated positions, separate defense areas, at most company-level positions. Unfortunately, many of these positions were designed in an unclear manner and constructed with insufficient quality, so they were ultimately not used. The main defensive line for Pokrovsk, which was convenient and advantageous for us to hold, was along the Novohrodivka-Selydove military line. In addition to the urban area, Novohrodivka and Selydove also have convenient slag heaps and elevated positions with radio horizons that allow for effective long-range drone use. The Novohrodivka-Selydove military line was the key defense line for Pokrovsk. Unfortunately, after brief battles, we had to withdraw from both Novohrodivka and Selydove. There was some destruction there, though only minor damage to the towns. We can see this now from the numerous videos posted by the enemy. The destruction is minimal because there were no major battles inside the towns themselves. The enemy managed to bypass these cities and capture them without heavy fighting, largely due to the loss of command and control. And this is the main threat. This year, the enemy managed to capture Avdiivka, take control of Vuhledar, and now they have nearly captured all of Kurakhove and most of Toretsk. In Toretsk, active battles are currently ongoing, and a significant number of settlements have been captured without direct fighting in the towns themselves. There were combat engagements, but they were not intense. It wasn’t a battle like those for Bakhmut or Mariupol. These were relatively short-lived skirmishes because the cities weren’t properly prepared for defense, and the flanks of these towns weren’t covered by defensive lines. As a result, the enemy avoided entering the urban areas and didn’t get involved in street fighting, instead moving through wooded areas and bypassing the towns. The enemy is now trying to capture Pokrovsk in the same manner. The main threat to Pokrovsk comes from the south, where the enemy is attempting to reach the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region and cut off the Pokrovsk-Dnipro highway. This is their primary objective at the moment.

Do you think there is a real threat to Kherson and Mykolaiv to be occupied?

At the moment, I don't see any threat to Kherson and Mykolaiv. The Russian command demonstratively showed that they are planning an amphibious operation in the Kherson area. They demonstratively concentrated their forces in this area, but in fact, the enemy did not take any serious actions there. It was more like reconnaissance by combat. Because at the moment the situation is tense along the Dnipro, indeed. But for the enemy, this is a very risky story. Why should the enemy take risks? When they have a fairly successful operation in the Pokrovsk direction and this is where they throw all their reserves. With heavy losses, but they do.

Would you like to tell us about the mess that is happening with the fallen soldiers and the problems that are created with their burial?

Dear friends, I cannot comprehend everything and I simply do not have the opportunity to follow this as well. If you have a specific story, I ask you to write to me, send it to my mailbox or Facebook messenger. I think this will be the most appropriate and we will simply publish your story.

Please tell us about the Koreans who were taken prisoner and died.

Koreans are generally very unwilling to surrender. I’ve only seen information about one Korean who did surrender. Most of them receive intense propaganda conditioning, encouraging them not to surrender. We know that this was also a common practice during the Korean War. These are elite, handpicked units—special forces and highly trained infantry units. They are used very selectively, and the few individuals who made it to our positions tried to blow themselves up with grenades rather than surrender. I know of four such cases where Koreans were surrounded, but they didn’t give up. It’s a result of their upbringing—communist ideology mixed with Eastern philosophy. Among the dead Koreans, we found Korean-language pamphlets explicitly stating that soldiers of the Korean People’s Army must not surrender. The instructions said to place a grenade under their head or in their body armor and detonate it. So, they follow these orders. I only have information about one Korean prisoner. I don’t know his fate—perhaps he will be identified later. I don’t know his condition because I’ve only seen a photo, and it’s unclear whether he was wounded or what his state was. We don’t know if he managed to survive or if he was evacuated from the combat zone, where enemy drones were actively operating.

Why did you change your mind about Umierov?

You have to do specific things. First, second, third, fourth, fifth, nothing complicated. In fact, I want people to see that the minister is responsible for the army, for the defense forces, for winning the war. I told him honestly, and I respect the fact that the Minister of Defense invited me, listened to me, and wrote down some things because that is his job. He listened, he looked and he responds to criticism. He responds to criticism in the sense that he invited me. What's going to happen now? Of course, I'm not going to hide anything. I said what I think should be done, what I see as mistakes and serious, major mistakes. I repeated to him that he is zero to the army in this case. The army does not know him, and nothing will change for the army if he is not in office. People will not even notice that Mr. Umierov is not there. A large number of people will only be happy to think that maybe there will be some changes, a more sane person. I hope that the Minister has realized this and will draw conclusions from it. Therefore, I have not changed anything in my assessments, but I respect the desire of one of the representatives of the authorities, one of the key people who is responsible for the war and for our victory, to hear criticism personally.

Do you think anything will change after your meeting with Umierov?

That was a week ago. We'll see what happens now. I will keep you informed.

Comment on Hordon's statement "Today, December 30, the day today, a historic meeting was expected at the Tops, and directly related to it was the end of the hot phase of the war".

Let's focus on the facts, on the events. I have repeatedly said that there are no signs of any significant changes in the war. There are no indications that either side will propose acceptable conditions for the other side to agree to stop the war right now. I’ve stated multiple times on air, and I can emphasize it again now, that there will be no political resolution to the war until Ukraine stops the enemy at the front line. If we enter negotiations while the enemy continues advancing and we are unable to stop them, it will be just like Minsk-1 and Minsk-2. We went to those negotiations under military pressure, showing that we couldn’t halt the Russian offensives on our own. Are negotiations beneficial for us? Are they even possible under these conditions? I don’t think so. The first condition for negotiating an end to the war is physically stopping the Russian offensive, destroying their strike groups, and inflicting losses that Russia cannot endure. So what losses are unbearable for Russia? They can’t withstand losses if they exceed 40,000 servicemen per month. We need to ensure that at least 40,000 are counted as irrecoverable losses, at least 40,000. And if we kill 40,000 or 50,000 a month, Putin’s resources for carrying out these offensives will quickly deplete. Is this possible? Our best units show that it is. Our best commanders prove that it is. Can this be scaled along the entire front line? Yes, it can. It’s possible. So, let’s not believe in promises on the internet or rumors, but trust in reality. If we take a pragmatic approach to the war, a logical approach, we can win this war. We can do it.

About Veres and recruitment. Is the battalion recruiting?

Yes, I wrote about it. Recruitment to the 20th Separate Regiment of K-2 unmanned systems under the command of Kyrylo Veres is underway. Also, his battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 54th Brigade, continues to hold its positions and defend Siversk. Of course, there are details. You can check out the K-2 page.

What steps should be taken to solve the drone problem?

This is a topic of great conversation. The main thing that needs to be done with drones is that we need planning that will be set out on paper, planning should be in the form of planning documents. That is, the goal, the calculation of forces and means, the calculation of needs in the context of these defense forces so that we can see. And we need to show which unit, which means showed the best results. How they are reinforced with people, how many drones and ammunition for drones, drone equipment per year they need. Calculate the total figure and then see how much we have. To look at the priorities, what types of drones, what guaranteed destruction have been inflicted on the enemy. This would also be important. And to allocate the most resources to the types of drones that give the greatest results in the war. In order of priority. First of all, to those military units that use these drones best. And this will be the solution. The best weapons and the best fighters should be sent to the best commanders. This is the only way to achieve the most effective implementation of any high-tech solution. So far, there is no such planning in Ukraine. That is why everything is quite chaotic. The provision of drones is absolutely chaotic. Units are created that are not equipped with people, drones, or equipment. There are a lot of them. This is a planning problem. This applies not only to drones but to any of our resources that are needed for war. I hope that again, conclusions will be drawn. I think that in the near future, in January, we will also make a broadcast. Another broadcast, which is necessary to win the war. I hope that Minister Umierov heard it, and maybe Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy or someone in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will hear it as well. This would be a good trend.

Will Syrskyi be dismissed?

There is a possibility of this. He will be dismissed, because I think that, of course, Volodymyr Zelenskyy will dismiss him not due to any organizational problems. After all, Zelenskyy's perception of the war is extremely emotional. If there is a large amount of bad news on the Internet and criticism of Syrskyi, then he will be dismissed. Now, the level of criticism that exists is not considered critical. There will be wide publicity in society, if posts criticizing Syrskyi start getting 10-20 thousand reposts on Facebook or a million or two million on YouTube, then Zelenskyy will remove him. In other words, public opinion has an impact, but it has an impact only if it is very publicized. There is something to criticize Syrskyi for, something, in my opinion, that should be dismissed, but the question is: Who should replace him? The problem with his replacement is not that we just need a new name. We don't need to replace Syrskyi just for the sake of replacing Syrskyi, we need to understand that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief must set clear, competent tasks for the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As we can see, Syrskyi does not come up with his own ideas on how to win the war, he is simply an executor. He is given orders in his office, and he tries to fulfill them verbatim. We see that the quality of execution is a big issue. So something has to be done. It should be done in terms of organization, not just in terms of appointing a new person. Because if you ask a person the way you asked Syrskyi, the result is unclear. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should analyze the situation based on some clearly defined criteria. I talked about them in my broadcast in October, saying that in order to win the war, we need decisions that can change the situation at the front. You can see them, they were published in writing on Censor, on YouTube, and I also had a stream. I will repeat it again in the near future. 

When will the incapacitated TDF (Territorial Defense Forces) be disbanded?

I don't know when it will be disbanded. Personally, I don't think the TDF should be disbanded. The TDF has its own tasks. The problem is that our military-political leadership does not understand how to use the TDF and why. It cannot define a clear task. Our leaders consider any military personnel to be assaultmen. Anti-aircraft gunners, anyone, send them all to the TDF. TDF has its own tasks, and the country needs TDF. The war has just clearly shown that there are a huge number of combat tasks that can only be performed by TD forces, and they are needed in war. And at war, at the front, of course, the TDF is not needed, because the TDF is equipped with very light weaponry—infantry, light infantry—which cannot perform the tasks assigned to it as if it were a regular military unit.

Please tell us about the 425th Separate Assault Battalion "Skala" (Rock). The guys are being sent to their deaths.

I have been in Pokrovsk, and not once, I spent a long time there in several of our units, and I want to tell you what I see now. The losses in the 425th Assault Battalion "Skala" at the moment in recent months,3-4, are much less than the losses in the brigades that are in the same direction. Well, that's how it works. Even lower than the losses in some individual battalions, some brigades in this area. I mean, what I have seen there now, I cannot say that everything is very good and everything is very good, I am talking about comparison with others. The 425th Assault Battalion "Skala" are the operators. It is the operational reserve of the commander of the OSGT (operational and strategic grouping of troops) Khortytsia, that is, the operational and strategic level, and it is used in all important areas for assault operations. So, of course, there are losses there, there are active actions. But what I see in terms of weapons, equipment, and infantry training, Skala, the 425th Assault Battalion, is far from a weak unit, and it is a combat-ready unit. This unit, I would like to say now, is one of the most combat-ready units near Pokrovsk. He is much more combat-ready than, unfortunately, the brigades he is now saving from losing their positions. I recorded a lot of interviews in the Skala battalion, and I will soon have a report. Following the criticism on social media about the 210th TDF battalion, which was actually attached to Skala, I specifically arrived at Skala after many requests, talked to the 210th battalion, recorded interviews with soldiers, talked to fighters and commanders. We recorded the interview after a group of soldiers from the 210th TDF battalion, who are part of Skala, returned from a combat mission in the village of Shevchenko and proved to be heroic there.  I would like to say that the 425th Battalion is now one of the core units of Pokrovsk's defense, relied upon and respected by all the military brigades that are part of this tactical group. Therefore, we need to talk about how the assault battalion is used, what tasks it receives, of course. We need to talk about specific cases, specific problems, but in general, I want to say that this is one of our most combat-ready units. This is the reality, which is confirmed by the soldiers themselves, with whom I spoke. And I talked to several dozen soldiers there. I think you understand that in a war, infantry, an assault battalion, is not a place where people will invent something. People who risk themselves, they speak quite frankly. 

How wrong was it to dismiss Zaluzhnyi? Or was it the right thing to do?

I have said this many times before. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is a person appointed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. If Volodymyr Zelenskyy starts saying that he doesn't like Zaluzhnyi, that he considers him politicized, that he doesn't agree with Zaluzhnyi's decisions to mobilize 500,000 citizens, if he starts political intrigues with his subordinate against his subordinate, criticizing publicly his subordinate, whom he himself appointed, it means that there is no adequate interaction or cooperation. How can you force Zelenskyy, who is responsible for war planning and mobilization according to the law, to do so? The president is responsible for mobilization according to the law on mobilization, not Zaluzhnyi or Syrskyi, the president is responsible for directing all resources to the front, he orders the government how much resources the government can spend. The president is in charge of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, listens to the situation and says, yes, this is a priority for us, this is not. He listens to the reports of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Therefore, it is impossible to demand from Zelenskyy that he keep a person in office with whom he does not want to cooperate. Of course, it would be worth raising the issue that we have been talking about a lot, that Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself is an absolutely incompetent person, his entire administration and political activity is built on a constantly large number of populist and very false statements. This is the wrong approach, but it is the way it is, he was elected by the citizens of Ukraine and there are no elections now, we cannot change him. There is an objective problem with this, but there is a management system that exists and works. Zaluzhnyi was dismissed because there was a conflict there. I have repeatedly said that our problem is not a surname, the problem is in defining the tasks and determining the ways to implement them. The problem is that we need to say that we are building fortifications and build a plan, a defense system, and do it. The problem is that we need to say that we are building a strategic defense and build a plan for the use of troops in accordance with this. We need to say that we are mobilizing, here is the plan, here is how we are preparing people, here is how we are distributing them and to which units. The problem is that instead of replenishing experienced combat-ready brigades, Zelenskyy approves the deployment of newly formed, empty, unnecessary new units that are absolutely combat-ineffective, that simply suffer heavy losses and cannot simply reach the level of combat capability. This is the problem, illiterate resource management, illiterate logistics. If you add another person to these decisions, to this mess, this chaos, we have several generals, I know at least two, who could be competent commanders-in-chief. But if they are put in such conditions, they will not be able to prove themselves either, just as Syrskyi cannot prove himself. It is impossible. It is impossible to throw a person with limited functionality into chaos and expect him to change everything. So I hope that the difficult situation at the front and I hope that the pressure of public opinion, which is the only influence on Zelenskyy that exists, will force him to make adequate decisions. Adequate decisions on a strategic scale. We have no other options at this time. We have to force the government to act according to the situation and instead of talking and empty talk, which Zelenskyy constantly voices in his addresses in the evenings, start speaking facts, recognizing problems and talking about programs that will be implemented later. And not the way he says in terms of sustainability that we have supplied 2.5 million Ukrainian-made ammunition, and then it turns out that a large number, even we don't know what percentage, is defective. He claims this. We have to stop lying. We need to stop lying to the authorities and take responsibility for our words. And then we will start to see changes. This is actually possible to do. I believe that we have a strong enough civil society to force the authorities to take adequate action. 

Muzhenko said he was ready for a comeback.

We know how Muzhenko worked. I think the army has already worked with him for 5 years. The second time he had 5 years and look at his statements, what he said, he did not fulfill almost everything. Everything that he promised in terms of reforms, in terms of after-action reviews, it was he who promoted these generals whom we are now criticizing. He criticizes Zaluzhnyi in his interview. It was he who promoted him to command positions. And he was given a general under Muzhenko. And all the others he criticized in the interview. These are all his students. I think we understand that this is all one management school, a school of manual control. I criticize everyone here a lot, and the military criticizes Syrskyi for his manual control. But Muzhenko himself used to command companies, platoons, battalions by phone from a command post 200 kilometers away from the front. This is also his style. I don't think we need to go back to that. The head of the army should be a person with experience of modern warfare, with successful experience. Because we are constantly told that there should be young people, people with war experience. But everyone has a different experience. There is the experience of unsuccessful operations, there is the experience of inept management, there is the experience of sitting in the basement and watching screens with streams. But this doesn't mean that this person has the right experience because everyone's experience is different. Therefore, it is necessary to define clear tasks and select a commander who meets these tasks, who, in my opinion, should be a leader for the army, and not just a scarecrow that all commanders are afraid of, who solves some individual tactical tasks while everything is collapsing. This is not an easy task in times of war. To find a person who is able to keep the entire strategic situation in mind, to have all the information about the enemy and us, and to focus priorities on a particular area. This is a complicated story. It cannot be solved overnight. We need a system of decisions, and the appointment of a new commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces should be a prepared, appropriate decision.

Will there be replacements for the OTGs with corps? What should be done with the OSGT?

First of all, Syrskyi's actions demonstrate his lack of competence as a leader, he opposes the creation of divisions, and to this day, he still cannot deploy a single corps to the front or assign it a stable composition of troops. I do not know when this will happen. If the command and control system at the operational-tactical level is at least streamlined, then we can discuss what to do with the OSGT. In my view, the OSGT is essentially an unnecessary level of command. If permanent corps operate on the front, this will inherently solve the issue of command and control. Okay, after the corps, it is possible to command the joint operational headquarters. This will be a normal thing. This is no longer a problem. Our main problem is that while we are at war, our main unit is a brigade, the enemy is fighting at the front with divisions, corps and armies of permanent strength. Siversk has been under attack continuously for two and a half years. The third Russian army, it was reformed from a corps. This army has a permanent composition of troops. They do not change, they are constantly moving forward. 

Thank you, friends, for being with us this year. Thank you to our 2,800 sponsors who support the ButusovPlus channel. It is a great honor for me and very important for our team. Thanks to your support, we can work effectively. In the near future, we will talk again about drone troops, the situation of the 155th Mechanized Brigade, and the problem of strategic decisions that are needed to win the war. All these topics that I have announced will be covered, I am preparing them. There will also be a topic on Russia's losses and how many people Russia used at what stage of the war. I am also doing this because I am preparing an analytical report on the third anniversary of the war to summarize the way we have come, to show what kind of strategic review we had, what has changed at the front, what was the plan of the Russian troops, how Ukraine reacted, and what is happening now, what the future of the war may be. Therefore, all these topics will be covered in the new one, in 2025.

The war will continue, dear friends, and there are no prospects for its quick end. Can we stop the enemy? Of course, we can. We are showing it, and it can be done if we have managerial and organizational decisions. Can Ukraine withstand in 2025? Will it have enough combat capability? I am convinced that it will. But if we don't change our approaches, the war will have already moved far into central Ukraine. If we do not change our approaches, the enemy will already start fighting in the Dnipropetrovsk region in 2025. We understand how big a problem this is.

Can Ukraine win? What should victory look like? Friends, Ukraine can win. First of all, we need to stabilize the front. Victory for us should mean that we hold this front and do not allow the enemy to advance even a single step. This will be our greatest victory for now. If we manage to stop the enemy, we will eventually be able to move forward. However, our immediate priority is to address the task at hand. We need to build a strategic defense, and this should be done in the upcoming year, 2025. This will only be possible if civil society applies pressure on the government. The current government operates in a mode of manual control. They lack the capacity and understanding of the magnitude of the events unfolding. If we do not demand strategic decisions, the front will continue to crawl and roll.  The enemy has the capacity to mobilize up to 400,000 people annually, as we have observed. If their losses exceed this number significantly, they will face a crisis. Because those 427,000 who signed contracts in 2024 are merely replenishing the actual losses they have suffered. In other words, they lost approximately 400,000–450,000 troops over the year. To completely drive them out, we need to inflict significantly greater losses. This includes casualties among those killed, wounded, and those who have already gone missing. Only then will we see a different result. Eliminating 30,000–40,000 enemy soldiers killed in a single month would also result in at least the same number of wounded, missing, and those who desert from the army.

If the enemy suffers approximately 120-150 thousand total casualties at the front, including both sanitary and irretrievable losses, then, naturally, Russia will not be able to sustain this war. Can we inflict 120-150 thousand casualties on the enemy along the 1200-kilometer frontline in a month? All the commanders I speak with at the front say yes, the enemy can be stopped. And there are areas where, I emphasize, this is already being achieved. Therefore, friends, I am confident in our army, in the Ukrainian defense forces, and in Ukrainian society. I want to remind you that war is always a challenging endeavor. The fact that we lack leadership experience and an understanding of how to wage war has been a common issue in many countries. Our strength and confidence lie in the ability of our society to influence the authorities. This is possible—it is a realistic task. Any state leadership faces limitations, and Russia cannot implement the changes that we can. We have a problem with organization, with scaling, with political will. But we are a democratic country. I am absolutely convinced that we can do it. So, friends, thank you for watching. Thank you for your support. We will continue to work for victory in the new year and do our best. 

We can really win this terrible war, save Ukraine and save the Ukrainian nation. First of all, on the battlefield. This is the only way. Thank you for the broadcast and glory to Ukraine!