Situation in Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove, Lyman directions. Oskil front
The situation at the front remains very difficult. Intense fighting is taking place along the entire frontline. First of all, these are the Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove, and Lyman directions, including our Oskil front.
So, the Pokrovsk direction. We see movements toward Vozdvyzhenka, Pishchane, and Novoolenivka, so the enemy continues to expand its bridgehead, advancing from Selydove, and look how far the Russians have already managed to cover from there. They have essentially turned Selydove into their rear base and are continuing their efforts to drive their wedge deeper and encircle Pokrovsk from the south. This is the main focus of the enemy's efforts, and they continue to redeploy reserves to this area, putting new units into action along the line of their advancing troops. The situation is very complicated, and the frontline still cannot be stabilized, despite the deployment of reserves and our newly formed troops.
Then the next direction. The direction of Kurakhove. The enemy continues to advance, and our troops are holding a highly disadvantageous position. The logic of these actions by the Ukrainian command remains unclear. Kurakhove is essentially lost, and the rationale for holding these positions for so long is unclear. If earlier the withdrawal to the Konstiantynopol-Andriivka line seemed like a logical step to stabilize the front, now the situation has become uncertain, as the enemy has already reached the vicinity of Konstiantynopol-Andriivka. Whether it will still be possible to organize a stable line of defense here, and whether there is still time to do so, remains a major question."
Next. Vremivka direction. The enemy is trying to surround Velyka Novosilka from Vremivka-Storozheve. In fact, Velyka Novosilka is now, the enemy did not engage in combat for the town, but by its tactics made a deep close envelopment of the town. And now it is very close to being surrounded. It will be surrounded from two sides, and the enemy will simply capture it. The situation here is very difficult, there are very, very heavy battles going on, the enemy is now throwing large forces to surround and capture Velyka Novosilka virtually without a fight. If we look at the road, the main highway that went to Velyka Novosilka has already been captured by the enemy. And now Velyka Novosilka, if you look at the map of the situation, is a very unprofitable and very difficult area for us to hold. Because the main highways are under the enemy's control, under fire, and to continue to hold Velyka Novosilka in this configuration means to suffer significant losses and give the enemy the opportunity to inflict losses with rapid strikes and advance further.
Unfortunately, the enemy has managed to cross the water on the outskirts of Terny village and take control of Ivanivka village. Now the enemy infantry is trying to advance on the village of Kolodiazi. In the village of Terny, the enemy is engaged in heavy fighting, and there is practically nothing left of the village, just barren, scorched land with scattered plantings, piles of garbage. However, the enemy has not managed to capture Terny yet. The 60th Mechanised Brigade is making incredible efforts, heroically holding back the Russian troops, but the enemy found weak points in the battle lines and crossed the water. Now the infantry is crossing the water, trying to expand the bridgehead from Ivanivka towards Kolodiazi. It's not exactly a comfortable situation for the enemy, but they have the strength and continue to attack. The enemy also managed to capture a commanding hill near the village of Makiivka in the Luhansk region, and this now serves as a staging point for further offensive operations. However, heavy fighting is currently taking place in the areas of Kruhliakivka and Pershotravneve, where the enemy is advancing from the north towards Borova, trying to break our troops. The 3rd Assault Brigade is now doing everything in its power to halt the Russian advance in this area, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, but Russian forces are making every effort to break through. The situation is very difficult, as two Russian armies on the front stretching from Terny to Kruhliakivka, including the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Moscow Military District, have concentrated all their forces and are intensively attacking along this entire front.
The situation in the Kursk region shows that the Russian-Korean troops tried to break through our buffer zone, the bridgehead held by Ukrainian forces. This maneuver, a minor tactical assault on a rural type settlement (khutor) near the village of Berdin, is marked in blue, which was carried out by Ukrainian troops. The situation here is difficult, but in this area, at this bridgehead, our troops are supplied with military equipment and ammunition, and although it is very difficult here, our combat-ready units, our formations are inflicting very, very heavy losses on the enemy. The maneuver towards Berdin is not fully understood, its expediency and whether we will take control of the new area or hold it remain in question. A large force of Koreans was ground off, there was a statement by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: two Koreans were captured by a unit of the Special Operations Forces, one was captured by the Armed Forces, and the other by an Airborne Forces unit of the Armed Forces. Two Korean servicemen were captured, and just a huge number, many dozens of Russian citizens, also surrendered. The enemy is launching frontal assaults one after another, and almost all of them are being repelled with massive losses for the Russian occupiers.
And then the situation in Siversk. The situation here remains very difficult, and the enemy is trying to drive a wedge around Bilohorivka. Russian troops suffered heavy losses, but they continued their attacks and were trying to capture Bilohorivka with all their forces. Bilohorivka, let me remind you, Makiivka, these are villages in the Luhansk region, and the enemy is making huge efforts to capture the last settlements of the Luhansk region that Ukraine retains and declare that the entire Luhansk region is captured. They have been doing this for three years now. The situation is very difficult, we can see the terrain of the frontline here, it is very complicated. The enemy has actually approached the outskirts of the commanding hill above Siversk, the commanding hill above Spirne, and if the enemy continues its attacks here, of course, and this hill falls, our troops will have nowhere to withdraw. Withdrawal from Bilohorivka, withdrawal from Verkhnokamianske - we will have to actually retreat behind the ridge of hills, and Siversk will be doomed, the enemy will capture it. There is nowhere to retreat in order to hold this Siversk bridgehead. The situation is very difficult, because our troops have not been receiving resupply here for a long time, both on the Lyman and here in Siversk, unfortunately, there are big problems with resupply.
So, this is the situation map: there is pressure everywhere, the enemy continues massive attacks, and, of course, the question arises as to why we still cannot stop the front. I want to note that my communication with unit commanders and fighters is not about the enemy having an advantage, but rather about the frustration that we still cannot respond to the enemy's patterned actions with our organized efforts. Now, if you look at open sources, by the end of 2024, it was sent to the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions... to address the question of where the mobilized people go. Indeed, it is clear where they go. At least seven brigades, replenished with personnel, were sent to this area. These include brigades from the 150th series: the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, and 157th, as well as the 5th heavy mechanized brigade, and the 32nd brigade, which was also replenished and directed to this area. Again, I quote social media data from these brigades. There may be additional forces, but at least seven brigades, based on what can be counted, are being deployed in this area, and yet there is no stabilization. I also want to mention that fighters-commanders from the Siversk and Lyman directions say that over the past month of the offensive, they have not received any reinforcements at all. That is, there are areas where significant forces from newly formed brigades are being sent. For some reason, this does not lead to the stabilization of the front, even though the forces are significant—no one can say that seven brigades are small forces. No, we see that formally, on paper, there is a concentration of forces, but it does not bring about changes. We are not establishing a stable front, and encounter battles continue. Large forces of these newly formed brigades are being sent to hold unfavorable defensive positions, such as Kurakhove, for example. In fact, the enemy is enveloping us, and once they have surrounded us and we are no longer able to hold, we attempt to send reserves to maintain control of these settlements for a while longer. What we see now is that Velyka Novosilka is essentially under operational encirclement, and holding it is extremely challenging for us. From Kurakhove, this pocket where our troops are stationed, even after losing Kurakhove, we are still not withdrawing, and it’s unclear why, as we’re not withdrawing to a more favorable position. Velyka Novosilka’s defense lines, which were once advantageous, have been lost. In other words, the decisions being made by the Ukrainian command—both operational and strategic—are completely incomprehensible to our forces. Instead of establishing a stable defensive line, deploying troops in advance, and placing experienced units who could form the backbone of our defense alongside newly formed brigades with less experience to build a reliable front and stop the enemy, we continue to engage in endless chaotic encounter battles against Russian reserves and force exchanges, which do not lead to the stabilization of the front that everyone is talking about. And all the reserves have been deployed, and they still can't fix the situation. And this is obviously not because of the number, not because our people are not motivated. But the way they are used, they cannot stop the enemy. This is the responsibility of the highest military command, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which controls this every day, but we see that this control does not lead to any results. And our troops in many parts of the front remain without any replenishment at all. We are giving the enemy the opportunity to undermine the entire front. As a result, stable and experienced brigades are left without replenishment, and those new brigades are being ground off by the huge number of those who have gone AWOL. This has its own logic. These newly formed brigades are created, they have a large shortage of drone operators, a large shortage of experienced platoon commanders, squad leaders, and of course, it is difficult for them to organize a battle. All these mistakes are repeated over and over again, month after month, and no changes are made. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is not drawing any conclusions from the situation at all. Now I have heard some encouraging signals today about the decision of the high command. We will check it out, and tomorrow (12.01.2025) I will talk specifically about the newly formed brigades and the scandal of the 155th Anna of Kyiv Brigade, what consequences it has led to, and this has led to some decisions. Including the decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
And today we have a very difficult operational situation. Kurakhove has been lost and there is no decision to withdraw from Kurakhove. In fact, in the operational environment of Velyka Novosilka, no timely decisions were made by the higher command. There were no timely decisions at all. The situation on the Oskil front is very difficult, the situation in Pokrovsk is unstable, and there are forces, but the way they are used, it is not possible to stop the enemy.
Answers to questions
Why are there no reinforcements in the critical Lyman direction?
This is also a question that all our troops have been asking for a month. There is an enemy offensive and zero reinforcements. This is simply criminal inaction. In fact, one of the newly formed brigades was supposed to be sent to this area, and there was already an order. But instead of feed it into the battle, it was already unloading there, and at the last moment this brigade was sent to the Kurakhove direction. And for the defense of that very ledge, which, after the enemy had surrounded Velyka Novosilka, after the enemy had actually deeply enveloped Pokrovsk from the south, no longer matters, it is already in the shadow of the Russian offensive. Nevertheless, a brigade from the Oskil front was sent to hold this ledge, and this did not allow us to stabilize the Oskil front at all. As a result, we lost favorable positions in Makiivka, we cannot destroy the Russian bridgehead that was in the Pishchane-Kruhliakivka area, and we have no density, and the enemy feels it, knows it. The Russians have intelligence, electronic intelligence, they have information about our groups and understand some of our forces, and the enemy is advancing. In other words, our leadership, in this case, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is undermining the frontline with his manual actions, with these manual reshuffles of troops, without a plan, without organization, without strategy, and it is the Ukrainian Military Command and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that are undermining the frontline with their ill-considered actions. When the enemy advances, and instead of reinforcing our troops and crushing the enemy's strike groups, are reserves being sent to help the enemy capture the Oskil line and advance toward Izyum, then continue to develop the direction further? And then secure it, reach Torske, and attempt to encircle our forces, capture our troops in the Serebrianskyi forest? Why is this happening? I don't see any logic in this, and it's not just me. Commanders and soldiers see no logic in it either—they don't understand. It's all just words from the top leadership, photo ops that carry no real responsibility. And the leadership of Oleksandr Syrskyi in these circumstances raises very serious questions. Very serious questions about whether one person can truly control what is happening right now. There are more and more questions every day.
Velyka Novosilka is writing to me. This is something that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff should pay attention to. Look at the situation. The enemy is advancing in this direction. Unfortunately, we do not have positions that could prevent this encirclement. If we don't want to do it now... So they repeated in Velyka Novosilka the same thing that happened two months ago in Vuhledar. It was exactly the same. And in no way could we prevent these patterned actions of the enemy. Now we can't waste our strength in these battles for the sake of prestige, to hold Velyka Novosilka for a few more days. It makes no sense. And our command, the top leadership, is sitting there and pretending that nothing has happened. Sit there, cling it on. Well, you didn't hold it again, you didn't hold the flanks. Why? There was no defense there. Several brigades were replaced on the flanks in that direction. One, then another, then another. These battalions were subordinated to one, then another, then another, then another. Where is the responsibility? There was no responsibility in this area from the very beginning. Syrskyi is constantly reshuffling the commanders of tactical groups and operational and tactical management. Assigned forces. Now one brigade is in charge, now the other, now the third, now the fourth. It's a really assigned. In the area of Novyi Komar, north of Velyka Novosilka, the operational subordination of the district defense has changed five or six times in the last two months. First one brigade, then a TDF brigade, then another TDF brigade, then another mechanized brigade, then another mechanized brigade. It was a complete managerial chaos. Irresponsibility. And they sit quietly and silently, not even commenting on the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or Syrskyi himself. Well, they could have come there and at least looked at it. You like to do photo shoots. Well, do a photo shoot there. It's a problem to get there now in Velyka Novosilka. So, we have to go there quietly, quickly. In fact, the enemy is on the verge of capturing such a large important hub as Velyka Novosilka, and its capture actually means that in this direction the enemy will now approach the borders with the Zaporizhzhia region. The enemy will capture the last district center of the Donetsk region in this area. And everyone saw it, everyone understood it. There was nothing unexpected, but it happened. Well, complete irresponsibility.
Wouldn't it make sense to hold elections to get rid of idiots who only spoil things?
Well, friends, there is a Great War going on, there are constant massive enemy attacks throughout the country. How can elections be held? We see how elections are being held here, there, electronic voting on the website of the Ministry of Defense. Of course, such decisions, decisions on elections, are really important for the country, become imminent. But this can only be done if there is a political consensus in the Verkhovna Rada and mechanisms are created to control the actions of our government. Who can doubt that the servants of the people will do everything to draw results for themselves in the electronic elections? Well, there is no doubt that if there is a small opportunity, they will draw whatever they want. So, of course, there is no trust in the actions of the authorities in the electoral process. And to conduct an election campaign when there are constant rocket attacks is a great threat to people, to the civilian population in the rear. And this is also a risk that the country cannot take. The situation now is that there is the only way we can, in my opinion, now, force the authorities, force Zelenskyy and his entourage to act, to stop these destructive actions on the front and constant failures in defense. This is through the broadest possible public pressure and mobilization of public opinion both in Ukraine and especially among our partners. We need our partners to also force the government to act, so that we have funding not only for the central budget but also directly for our best military units. This situation requires a response. We have to talk about it. Now, slowly, due to inept actions, and I must say, first of all, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not pay any attention. They were sitting there, making political statements, and Zelenskyy was saying something on the air again. Have you heard the words "Velyka Novosilka" and "Defense" lately? Well, he said several times that something was under control there. Well, we can see the control. Syrskyi is quietly dealing with the Kursk region, redeploying brigades and simply managing the frontline in a manual mode. We see on the example of the Oskil front that this is absolutely chaotic, unplanned, and without logic. Here are the results.
Pokrovsk. We see that the enemy is going to capture Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the same way. And he is going to do it. They are not going to get involved in urban warfare. And they continue to advance. And now we see they want to reach the Mezhova-Pokrovsk highway. They are actually on it. And if they get there, they will have only six kilometers to reach the Pokrovsk-Dnipro highway. And that's it. At the same time, the enemy is trying to surround and drive a wedge from the north and capture Myrnohrad. In order to completely surround and capture both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without urban warfare. This is what is happening. This is happening gradually. And there are no decisions. Month after month, and Zelenskyy and Syrskyi and Umierov have news, news, news
In recent days, after all the scandals that have occurred with the 155th Brigade, certain decisions have been made, and we will see how they will start working at the front. Tomorrow we will talk about them. But I want to say that sometimes, under public pressure, when there are a lot of reposts, the government is forced to do some things, with a very long delay, and makes some decisions that are appropriate to the situation. But then another thing happens. They don't have time to implement them. This is what happened on the Oskil front. Reserves were redeployed, and at the last moment they were taken away. We were fed, fed with promises. Hold on, hold on, hold on. Our soldiers held on, did everything possible, impossible. Then they took them and Syrskyi was just misleading people. In fact, I want to say that what Oleksandr Syrskyi has been doing in recent months, especially, this man is simply losing the trust of his subordinates. Everyone knows that Syrskyi's word is worthless. This person is easily misleading, and he will say, I support you, I will do it, and then he will mislead. Unfortunately, this is a massive story on the frontline. And this loss of trust in the army is a very big problem. People are not dissatisfied with the fact that the enemy has an advantage in numbers. They are dissatisfied with the fact that the lack of planning does not allow the enemy to be defeated. Although we all see what will happen next, everyone knows. There is nothing unexpected.
Is the situation in the Kursk region critical?
The situation in the Kursk region is, in principle, difficult. But Kursk is not critical. If our troops gradually withdraw from there, it will not be a crisis for us. For us, the main front was and is the front in Donbas.
Without general mobilization from 18 to 60 years old, we`ll lose. This should have been done in 2022, when we were winning this war.
Our situation now, if we look at it strategically, is no worse than in 2022. The situation at the front is difficult not only for Ukraine, but also for the Russian command. And I want to say that the enemy is making all this gains at great cost. Their losses are greater than ours, even. Why are they advancing? What does a Ukrainian commander need to hold the front? He needs organization, planning, commanders on the ground, training, drones, and people. What does a Russian commander need? Only live cannon fodder. Russian reserves can be engaged in battle without training, without planning, just following a drone in a direction, and they will go. Therefore, while for Ukraine the use of reserves, achieving an advantage on the battlefield is the result of good management, good organization, and good support, for the Russian command it is simply an order to go forward. They have simple conditions for the use of reinforcements. In this model of infantry warfare, when we put up a meaty defense against meaty assaults in the forest plantation, it is actually an encounter battle. In this model of war, it's meat assault against meat defense and they win. In the model of infantry for infantry exchange, they win. They lose when Ukrainian commanders oppose the Russian offensive with planning, organization, timely rotation of people, supply, support, drones, and interaction between drones and infantry. That is, comprehensive solutions. When this is not available, we lose ground. That is why it is so critical that instead of replenishing experienced combat-ready troops, we are replenishing and using newly formed troops that have no experience.
Yurii, are there any changes after Drapatyi's appointment to the Army? Tarnavskyi to the OTG Donetsk?
Tarnavskyi, there are no changes. On the contrary, now there is a question whether he perceives reality adequately. The issue is that in fact, the Donetsk OTG needs a commander who has the will, character, and understanding of the situation. We see that this is lacking here. As for Drapatyi, I would like to say that according to the feedback from the Army Command and those who communicate with Mykhailo Vasylovych, the feedback is very positive. People are inspired and expect Drapatyi to take his vision into these first steps, to spread it, and to implement his principles of work in the army. Well, the question here is that in order for something to work in our system, for rapid changes to take place, we need to make appointments like the one made in the case of Oleksandr Syrskyi himself, who was both the commander of the army and the commander of the Khortytsia operational and strategic group. Well, this tandem works well. A separation of the position of the Commander of the Ground Forces from the position of direct command on the front will still make it difficult for Drapatyi to demonstrate his capabilities. I think that in this case, if a person is appointed to the command of the ground forces, it is necessary and logical to expect that he will be given the same powers as Oleksandr Syrskyi was at one time, and he will also be the commander of a group of troops at the same time. Then there will be reforms in the ground forces, changes, and at the same time the implementation of these changes directly on the front line. There will be logic. Let's hope Drapatyi has just been appointed, perhaps such decisions will be made in the near future.
Once again, I'm surprised by any political maneuvers that are being announced in our media. There are no signs that the offensive of Russian troops will be stopped by political means. That the war will be stopped, and that there will be elections. I see no such signs. On the contrary, I see signs... that the enemy may continue to advance and we will lose so much land that there will be a threat to the very existence of our state. This is the real threat I see, not that I'm just surprised by the sometimes entertaining tone we have when politicians talk about not the fact that the Motherland is in danger, but that we need to pay attention, we need to concentrate all our attention, we need to talk about Velyka Novosilka, we need to talk about Pokrovsk. And talking, and influencing, and making decisions, all of this is missing. I'm surprised that when people talk about elections now, it means they don't understand what's happening at the front. There is an offensive, and the enemy is not going to stop. What elections are there now?
Yurii, in your opinion, if some kind of negotiation format is opened after Trump's inauguration, what will be the fate of Kharkiv?
I don't see any reason for negotiations to begin, nor has Trump voiced any conditions that would force the aggressor to sit down at the negotiating table and cease fire. Kharkiv is currently being reliably defended by our soldiers. The 92nd Brigade, the 13th Brigade of the Charter National Guard, and the 42nd Brigade are defending it. And there is a fairly reliable front line there. Our soldiers will not allow the enemy to approach Kharkiv. Kharkiv is securely under Ukrainian control, in Ukrainian hands. It is safe. At the moment, with the current frontline configuration, there is no doubt about it.
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