Expensive rarity: Why Defense Ministry’s Agency is buying World War II-Era anti-tank mines
Serhiy Zhurets writes about this in his article for Espresso.
Year of manufacture of the mines as recorded in the document: "1941+"
"Ukraine is purchasing anti-tank mines that were manufactured 80 years ago, and at a rather high price. This contract was initiated by the leadership of the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA). There are significant doubts that these rarity mines will strengthen our defense. However, over 200 million euros will literally be buried in the ground."
...This is a brief outline of the story, already known to many individuals involved in supplying weapons to Ukraine. My anonymous conversations with arms industry experts and military personnel familiar with the use of mines have convinced me that this shady deal deserves public attention—without mentioning contract numbers or company names.
Rush before the New Year
The factual beginning of the "mine-explosive case" can be traced to December 31, 2024, when Maryna Bezrukova, the head of the Defense Procurement Agency, sent an official letter to the Director of the Department of Military-Technical Policy, Armaments, and Military Equipment Development.
The letter includes a request to urgently approve the nomenclature and volumes of goods under a draft government contract with a Bulgarian company. According to this contract, the DPA is purchasing hundreds of thousands of M6A2 anti-tank mines with fuzes. The cost is nearly €600 per unit.
The recorded year of manufacture for the mines, as stated in the document, is "1941+." This means that indeed more than 80 years have passed since these mines were produced. However, the contract specifies that "the seller warrants the goods are fit for use."
Payment terms: The Defense Procurement Agency initially makes "a payment of 10% of the total value of the goods." The remaining 90% is paid based on an invoice and upon receipt of a copy of the Report of Goods`Technical Inspection prior to shipment.
The Director of the Department responded to the Head of the DPA with a letter stating that the draft contract had been reviewed, the product nomenclature aligns with the "List of Needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" based on the required priority, and the contract was approved.
This chain of interaction between the state department and the state enterprise Defence Procurement Agency is a necessary legal formality, without which the DPA cannot enter into contracts with suppliers or vendors. This is because the weapons and equipment to be purchased must meet the needs of the Ministry of Defence based on requests from the General Staff.
Military vintage from the Second World War
The M6 anti-tank mine and its modifications are an American design, a pressure-activated mine encased in metal. It weighs 9 kg, of which 5.4 kg is TNT. The M6 and M6A1 variants were equipped with M600 and M601 chemical detonators, while the M6A2 version introduced a safer M603 mechanical fuze."
By the end of 1944, the United States had already produced 2.5 million of these mines, with production steadily increasing thereafter. The M6A1 and M6A2 mines were removed from US Army service in the late 1960s. It was determined that 5 kg of explosives was insufficient to disable the tracks of enemy tanks, prompting the replacement of the M6 with the more powerful M15 mines, which contained 10 kg of TNT.
There are no remaining stocks of M6A1 and M6A2 mines in US warehouses. However, reports indicate that substantial quantities of these mines were either purchased or received by countries in Asia, South America, and Africa. For instance, around 1 million mines were transferred to South Vietnamese government forces between 1965 and 1970.
There are still a number of countries where stockpiles of such mines have been stored and are still stored, and a Bulgarian intermediary firm has offered to resell them to Ukraine, with the intention of making significant windfall from this dubious deal.
Time and weapons
"Are the M6A2 mines that the DPA intends to buy or has already purchased for the Armed Forces of Ukraine suitable for use? One of my interlocutors claimed that "those mines—located outside Bulgaria, in a third country—are just rusty." This statement is likely somewhat emotional, as it is unlikely that anyone has inspected all the several hundred thousand mines.
Another argument I encountered referenced Order #4 of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated January 4, 2019, which categorizes rocket and artillery weapons (RAW) from the first category—new and technically sound weapons—to category five, which is unsuitable for its intended use. According to this order, the maximum service life for weapons under the RAW category is 40 years. However, when dealing with missiles and ammunition, service life determination and extensions are based on laboratory test results.
That said, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines do not fall under the rocket and artillery weapons category. Their quantitative requirements are determined by the Logistics Forces Command, while their use is managed by engineering units operating within the Support Forces. It is likely within this chain that the shelf life of mines and engineering munitions is assessed.
And what happens to the TNT in mines and ammunition over decades? The topic is almost dissertation-worthy. Foreign experts estimate that TNT retains its core properties for up to 35 years (Defence Science Journal, Vol 43, No., July 1993). However, there are far more optimistic assessments suggesting that TNT in munitions casings almost never changes its explosive properties, even over 60 years
At the same time, open sources provide an interesting fragment about M6A2 mines: "The mine's service life is not defined in the guidelines. When the metal casing of the mine deteriorates due to corrosion, its sensitivity decreases from 150-338 kg to 3-5 kg."
"So, it appears that the mine might detonate not under the pressure of a tank track but under significantly less force. Can it be used in this condition for deployment?"
One military engineer commented on this issue as follows: "If these mines were handed over to us for about a dollar apiece, it would be excellent. We’d find a use for them, considering the shortage of TNT in general. Here, we have 5kg in one piece, which could be combined with something else. But a mine is also about the fuze. It’s a critical component. The condition of the fuze, where and how it has been stored over these 50 or 80 years, remains unknown. Whether it can effectively detonate the mine can only be determined through proper technical or laboratory testing. A cursory inspection would not suffice."
Interim conclusions
1. The Armed Forces and the Defence Forces of Ukraine have an urgent need for a significant number of anti-tank mines. This is directly linked to the strengthening of defensive capabilities across almost all frontlines. The demand can be measured in millions of mines and continues to grow over time.
Given this, the Department of Military-Technical Policy, Armament, and Military Equipment Development of the Ministry of Defence promptly approves proposals from the DPA for mine supplies. This is especially relevant as, at the beginning of last year, this very Department of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine — amid a critical shortage of TM-62 mines or their analogues — failed to include them in the "2024 Procurement List" altogether. This led to internal disputes, as such an omission could be interpreted as negligent inaction bordering on undermining the country’s defence capability.
Perhaps this is why the Department has not delved deeply into the specifics of what the M6A2 mine is or whether it serves as an analogue to the TM-62. As for the technical suitability of these mines, that responsibility clearly falls within the purview of the Defence Procurement Agency.
2. This appears to be the first time the DPA has purchased anti-tank mines of this type and date of production for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If the production year in question is "1941+", though more likely sometime after 1944, this raises immediate concerns about the reliable functionality of these mines for their intended purpose. Does the Act of Technical Inspection include a thorough verification of these mines' operational capabilities, involving either engineer forces or specialised technical experts? This question arises straightaway. If the mines are accepted by the military based solely on formalities and then fail to stop Russian equipment on the battlefield due to issues with the fuzes or other technical deficiencies, it will be too late to address the problem. One hopes this isn't a case of relying on the assumption that "the war will write everything off..."
3. "The supplier offers rarity M6A2 mines from the Second World War at a price of 590 euros, which the DPA leadership accepts. However, there is evidence that, ironically, the same Bulgarian company supplied much more recent TM-62 anti-tank mines to Ukraine in 2024 for 550 euros. What changed so dramatically? Mines, unlike wine, do not increase in value with age..."
Notably, the Bulgarian company acts as an intermediary, not a manufacturer of the mines. Meanwhile, the DPA claims that one of its 2024 achievements was expanding direct contracts with manufacturers of military equipment and weapons to reduce wasteful spending. This was highlighted in Maryna Bezrukova's column in Ukrainska Pravda: "More weapons, fewer intermediaries. Defence Procurement Agency in 2024 - in figures." However, it seems that the relationship between the DPA leadership and the Bulgarian company has stood the test of time as well as TNT. Although, of course, this is merely an assumption.
4. There is another version of events. Force majeure approval of the contract for the procurement of several hundred thousand M6A2 anti-tank mines, worth hundreds of millions of euros, on 31 December 2024 coincided with a particularly challenging situation surrounding the DPA.
In the aforementioned column in Ukrainska Pravda, the Head of the DPA, Marina Bezrukova, noted: "Recently, the issue of the Agency's ability to utilise the annual budget has sparked heated discussions. It can be assumed that information about significant balances on the DPA's accounts was used to raise doubts about its capacity to spend these funds by the end of the year and to justify the transfer of UAH 23 billion to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)."
Let me remind you that in November 2024, these UAH 23 billion were promptly reallocated from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget to the SBGS, the head of the SBGS pledged to use this sum to purchase ammunition for the MoD. This decision was made after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's HQ declared the inability of the MoD's procurement agency to fully utilise its allocated funds for weapons procurement. However, the de facto transfer of these UAH 23 billion to the SBGS still raises questions—this money was rapidly spent on contracts for artillery ammunition at premium prices through a Polish intermediary. I hope all the promised shells will be delivered on time...
The lesson from this "fund take over" has been learnt. Therefore, by the end of 2024, the state enterprise's management reported that "out of the Agency's annual budget of UAH 306.1 billion for the procurement of weapons and military equipment, 100% of budgetary obligations were committed under signed contracts, and 99.2% of the amount was paid to suppliers. This achievement is particularly noteworthy given that 25% of the total budget was allocated to the DPA only in October."
However, if the drive to achieve 100% budget commitment was one of the factors behind the contract with the Bulgarian intermediary, then it is probably worth analyzing other contracts concluded in late 2024 under similar force majeure conditions, this analysis should focus on the price-quality-time balance, as illustrated by the case of vintage American M6A2 anti-tank mines from the Second World War.
Thus, this story should definitely have a continuation...
"Serhiy Zgurets, Ukrainian journalist, military expert. Author of publications on the military-industrial complex of Ukraine. Exclusively for Espresso."
