Creation of army corps is essential reform of Armed Forces

First of all, I would like to acknowledge the very significant loss we all suffered on February 3. Anton Spitsyn, one of the co-founders and the commander of one of the most combat-capable drone strike units, "Peaky Blinders," passed away on the frontline due to severe injuries. This cap, from "Peaky Blinders", I have is from Anton. He gave it to me in May 2024, when the massive Russian offensive on Kharkiv began. Anton and the "Peaky Blinders'' were among the first to engage the Russian advancing forces, inflicting heavy losses on them and defeating the offensive. From the early days of the Russian invasion, Anton established a unit that initially specialized in aerial reconnaissance and attack drones. This unit, as part of the Omega Special Forces of the National Guard, made a substantial contribution to the defense of Kharkiv and the defense of Ukraine as a whole. Anton’s unit, the "Peaky Blinders," earned significant combat credibility on the frontlines. As part of the Omega unit, they were deployed to one of the most intense sectors of the frontline, in the Kurakhove direction, where the fiercest battles for Donbas were unfolding. It was there, while selecting a position for his crews, that Anton came under fire a few days ago, sustained severe injuries, and his comrades pulled him from the battlefield. Anton always took responsibility, being the first to enter the most dangerous areas, taking on the risk himself to ensure his unit's combat effectiveness. May the memory of Anton Spitsyn, a true Ukrainian hero, be eternal. His mission to defend Ukraine will continue. We will do everything we can to support Anton's comrades, brother and friends in continuing his mission. May Anton Spitsyn's memory be eternal.

The problem of creating an army corps

I have talked extensively on streams and written a lot about this issue, and it has resonated strongly because it was a frontline necessity. In July 2024, I published one of my most well-known posts, which sparked significant attention in the media and civil society. And thanks to the fact that public opinion in Ukraine works, it led to certain political outcomes. Following a series of scandals related to the organization of our troops, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the following notable statement after a meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief:

"I held a meeting of Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There are specifics among the issues of forming corps in the Armed Forces of Ukraine that we will continue to strengthen our army. We are scaling up combat brigades and expanding proper military experience. Based on the first selected brigades, further systemic steps will follow. Modernizing the army system has no alternative. This path is open to creating an army corps."

Oleksandr Syrskyi also made a statement.

So, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces stated that, given the current challenges, we are working to strengthen the army and transitioning to the implementation of a corps structure. These are critical initiatives and decisions. In this livestream, I will explain what the corps structure means for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, what is needed for this reform to be effective, and what changes lie ahead to ensure that it can truly function.

What is corps?

How it works in NATO armies. There is a well-known, current US Army regulation, FM 3-94, which is continuously updated. The 2021 edition is the latest version, and it is constantly amended. This regulation defines the purpose of armies, corps, and divisions. I would like to remind you that the US Army structure has remained quite stable and virtually unchanged since the post-World War II era. The US Army follows a structure that consists of battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps. During large-scale combat operations, separate headquarters are created, as seen in various overseas operations, including wars in Iraq and Vietnam. However, in the US Army, troops are organised and managed at the level from battalion to corps. Why is this the case? Because the larger the force, the more personnel, the wider the frontlines on which operations are conducted, the more the army's structure needs to be improved.

How the command and control structure changed after Ukraine's independence.

The organisation of the Ukrainian army between 1992 and 2003 was inherited from the Soviet Union. At that time, we had four levels: army corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions. Then, during the Armed Forces reforms from 2004 to 2014, the division level was removed. It was argued that this was necessary to save money. As a result, we were left with corps, brigades, and battalions, but no divisions. In 2012, the traitor of Ukraine, now a Russian citizen, Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, announced a reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This reform aimed to reduce the size of the Ukrainian army to 70,000 personnel within a few years, making the structure unnecessary, and the organisation of troops was simplified to its maximum: brigade and battalion. After that, only administrative bodies remained, with no operational command.

What has changed since the reforms were introduced in 2013?

Yanukovych was no longer in power, but it is worth noting that his legacy strangely persisted. The disbandment of army corps was completed in 2014. So, what is changing in 2025? The corps is being reintroduced as they were in 2004, meaning that we are restoring the corps. What do all these reforms signify? Every time these changes occurred, they were justified solely on economic grounds at each stage. Firstly, it was argued that maintaining a large number of military command units was too expensive. Secondly, there was a popular myth in Ukraine that, according to NATO standards, divisions were unnecessary and overly complicated.

I have already demonstrated the US Army's doctrine, where divisions played a role in both the First and Second World Wars. In large-scale warfare, this is an economically justified decision, because the larger the frontline and the more intense the fighting, the higher the need for effective organization and coordination of troops. There must be a command centre responsible for the area, the personnel, the weapons, and the destruction of the enemy within that area. In other words, the commander must have all the necessary forces, means, personnel, administrative and organizational leverage within their zone to fulfill combat missions. However, this was not implemented. Why was it not done? Since 1992, all of these so-called "reforms" have failed to reduce the administrative management apparatus of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. In fact, if we look at the number of headquarters, it has always grown.

And what started in 2014, what became apparent during the hostilities? That we had a separate management chain in the army, combat management, command and control, and a separate organizational chain.

So, the command of the troops at the front has remained the same throughout the three years of the full-scale war. We have a battalion, a brigade, a tactical group, and then an operational-tactical group, an operational-strategic group. The battalion and brigade are the core organizational structures. The last commander on the frontline responsible for the area, personnel, weapons, and the destruction of the enemy was the brigade commander. However, the commander of the tactical group, the OTG (Operational-Tactical Group) commander, and the OSGT (Operational Strategic Group of Troops) commander were all part of temporary command structures. They were not permanent staff positions, and personnel were assigned there for a certain period of time. The tactical group commander was not directly responsible for the troops. Similarly, the OTG and OSGT commanders were not responsible for personnel, weapons, or troops. Their responsibility was limited to assigning tasks. That's it. Now, changes are expected: higher-level tactical groups will be formed, and perhaps the operational and tactical groups will be replaced by corps. This is still a matter of discussion, so tactical groups will certainly be phased out. There is also the possibility that operational-tactical groups will be replaced. The only structure remaining could be the active army headquarters, to which the corps will report. This is one potential outcome, but I do not rule out the possibility that the OTGs may remain. When the argument is made that positions and structures will be streamlined to save costs, in reality, without proper planning, these changes only result in more management structures, more personnel, and more headquarters. What drives all of this? It's always political reasons.

Why, if this structure worked in NATO armies, the United States, France, Britain, and Poland, do they all have a battalion, regiment or brigade, division, and corps structure? Why didn’t Ukraine have this? These are seemingly obvious things. They are present in all military textbooks, and it is clear that this structure is necessary. But it was never implemented. In 2014, instead of restoring the corps we previously had, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko, who stayed on from Yanukovych's era and signed off on Yanukovych's reform, continued this trend and eliminated the corps. He did not restore them, but instead created sectors during the anti-terrorist operation, followed by operational-tactical commands. Why was this done? It is clear that all these transformations, which we are now reversing by restoring the 2003 structure of our Armed Forces, were purely political decisions. The military and political leadership of the country has always pursued its political agenda by changing people, altering command structures to suit specific individuals, and generally replacing personnel, destroying existing institutions to build new ones. In Ukraine, reforms are carried out purely for political purposes.

I hope that there will be more competent and balanced decisions in 2025. Why did Muzhenko do this in 2014? He completed this reform, even though he could have rolled it back even then, under the new President Poroshenko. And I want to say that in 2014, I repeatedly wrote that the management structures of the OTG were completely inadequate for the management of the troops and the situation at the front. At that time, the fighting was not so intense, and therefore neither the military nor the political leadership of the country paid attention to this. And for a long time they have not paid attention to it even now.

In fact, this structure of temporary, improvised command bodies—tactical group, OTG, OSGT —which lacks responsibility, is convenient because the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces can change the command of operations very quickly, without any problems. Almost instantly. You remove the commander of the OTG and reassign him elsewhere. It’s very convenient. You have an army command structure controlled by a single individual. Due to weak institutions in the state and in the Armed Forces, and throughout the Defence Forces, every leader wants to have the levers to dismiss anyone, regardless of their merits or career, push them out of their position, get rid of them, and act as they please. That’s it. This is why our generals love to command. We know how often the Commander-in-Chief interferes directly at the tactical command level. He can call a battalion commander, or even a company commander. Muzhenko, during the ATO, was known to call company commanders. They love to manage by interfering with tactical command through all levels of the hierarchy. In my opinion, this is a problem of the low competence of the people who promote them. Because the leaders in our army who are being promoted—company commanders, battalion commanders—rise quickly through the ranks without going through the full vertical of service, and often for political reasons. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian military leadership—I'm talking about all of them, the commanders-in-chief without exception—never fully understood the importance of creating corps-level organizational structures for purely political reasons. They didn’t want powerful, decentralized command centers in the army where their competitors might operate, where things couldn't be micromanaged. This is the core truth of this situation.

The situation at the front is so critical now, and the failures in the organisation of the troops made by the General Staff and the Ground Forces Command are so obvious to everyone, they cause so much indignation in society that the state leadership, under pressure from public opinion, I emphasize, after the wave in the media, is forced to make basic changes. Three years of war have passed. I actually welcome this decision. This is a demonstration that our society, even our government, is capable of forcing difficult decisions that seem obvious.

So, why is this obvious to us and why is it needed at the front?

Currently, active hostilities are taking place along approximately 1,200 kilometers of the frontline. Since the start of the war in 2022, Ukraine has deployed headquarters at the front, which are either fully or partially operational. According to estimates from open sources such as Wikipedia and Facebook, there are a total of 114 brigade headquarters. These 114 brigade commands maintain their area of responsibility or were assigned one during the war. Some may have been pulled back from the front, but they remain available for deployment. This means that 114 ground force brigades of various types have been deployed. Additionally, there are at least 7 assault regiments and at least 5 separate assault battalions, which also carry out tasks and have their own designated areas of responsibility or occasionally receive such areas. In total, this amounts to 126 military units across all types of ground forces—tank, motorized infantry, heavy, mechanized, airborne, air assault, assault, coastal defense, marines, security, presidential, and all other types.

If we take the average brigade size, which can range from 4 to a maximum of 8 battalions, and use an average of 5 battalions per brigade, we have around 600 ground force battalions currently deployed and operating on the front, either periodically or fully holding their sectors across a 1,200-kilometer front. This is an enormous number of military units—some independent, others part of brigades. Commanding and controlling such a force is extremely challenging. Imagine 600 battalions and 126 separate military units at the brigade level, some of which operate autonomously, while others are at the brigade, regiment, or battalion level. This is a vast and complex structure to manage. Effective organization is crucial, as controlling 126 entities—each with its own internal subunits—is a nearly impossible task. And then, on top of that, there are hundreds of subunits, drones, artillery, navy, and aviation forces. The sheer scale is immense.

Therefore, the creation of corps should first and foremost ensure the organization of the utilization, unity, command and control of troops. This means that troops will be assigned a specific sector, and in that sector, they will operate as a fully integrated force. The corps commander will now bear responsibility for their troops and for the execution of combat missions. Oleksandr Syrskyi has stated that new corps will soon be created.

What will these corps look like?

According to Censor.NET sources, the leadership of the Defense Forces is discussing the creation and deployment of 20 corps. In other words, these 114 brigades, along with separate regiments and battalions, will all be a part of the structure of these 20 corps. Additionally, there will obviously be units directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The creation of such a large number of units and corps constitutes a genuine reform. Many people are already aware that Ukraine has army corps 9, 10, 11, and several others, including the 7th Airborne Corps, have been established. What’s the difference? The corps created in 2023 have, in practice, remained primarily administrative structures. Their main function has been organizing the newly formed brigades. Operational commands are currently responsible for organizing the generation of troops, but alongside these operational commands, army corps were established as additional administrative structures.

And now, our corps is becoming a true corps, not just in name but as intended by the entire history of military experience, as seen in any country in the world. They are becoming command and control bodies for troops during combat operations. This means that it is no longer the brigade commander who will be the highest-ranking officer in any section of the front, but the corps commander, who commands multiple brigades, it is now the corps commander who will be responsible for the outcome in their area of responsibility.

The 20 corps currently planned for the 1,200-kilometre front will provide, on average, a sector of approximately 60 kilometres per corps. However, the actual structure will be slightly different. Corps will also be stationed in areas where there are no active hostilities, meaning the sector may be much larger. Based on available information, the first corps in our Armed Forces will serve as a model for testing the structure. These corps will be formed from the best commanders and brigades of the Armed Forces and the National Guard of Ukraine.

According to our sources within the Defence Forces, the first corps to be deployed in the Ground Forces will be the Third Corps, based on the 3rd Assault Brigade. The current commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade, Andrii Biletskyi, will command this corps, which will also be reinforced with additional troops. Each corps will consist of at least 4-5 brigades, plus independent units. The area of responsibility for a corps could stretch up to 150 kilometres.

Two corps will also be deployed within the Airborne Assault Forces. Obviously, the 30th Marine Corps, which currently performs only administrative functions, will integrate a set of marine troops and will also receive its own area of responsibility. Additionally, other corps will be established based on our best brigades, such as the 92nd Assault Brigade, and each of these corps will receive its own area of responsibility.

It is important to note that even before this decision was made by the Armed Forces, the National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko had already decided to deploy corps in late 2024. At Pivnenko’s initiative, two National Guard corps are also planned. One of these corps will be created on the basis of the 12th Brigade of the National Guard, Azov. Its commander will be Denys Prokopenko, call sign Redis. The second corps will be established on the basis of the 13th Brigade of the National Guard, "Charter" led by Colonel Obolenskyi. These are the first such projects to be deployed and will require significant changes. Each of these National Guard brigades will also receive its own set of troops from the National Guard of Ukraine.

What will this bring to Ukraine? What will change?

Now, brigade commanders will be clearly integrated into the corps command structure. The corps commander will be the person responsible for a larger section of the front. Unfortunately, this structure has been in place for the enemy since the end of 2022. The Russian army operates and fights within a hierarchy of regiments, brigades, divisions, and army corps. This gives the enemy an advantage in troop management and coordination.

What does this mean? Currently, for example, a brigade receives an assignment but is stretched along the front. It cannot quickly receive reinforcements if the enemy launches an attack against it or if the brigade itself conducts offensive assault operations. A brigade can only rely on its own forces and the goodwill of the commander of the tactical group of the OTG-OSGT—if that commander even hears the brigade’s request. But they may not, as they have their own tasks, and their brigades and brigade commanders may change. Tactical group commanders are only responsible for their own tenure; they do not bear responsibility for the entire force composition at the front. For a corps commander, however, the situation is different. If he leads poorly, all his brigades suffer. If he fails to support his brigades, maneuver forces effectively, reinforce critical areas, provide opportunities for rest and internal rotation, or withdraw battalions when necessary, he risks grinding down his troops. In that case, he loses not just soldiers but an entire corps. And his decisions impact a significant section of the frontline.

We used to have complete chaos in this regard. Brigades were being ground down in silence, and a large number of brigade commanders lied in their reports. Even now, those who are appointed, unfortunately, continue to falsify reports to keep their positions. Because if a brigade commander tells the truth, he can be easily replaced. Who is he, after all? Just a brigade commander, a leader of a tactical unit.

The situation in troop management should now improve significantly because corps commanders will have real authority and cannot be easily dismissed. They will have a vested interest in providing truthful reports on troop conditions, personnel numbers, weapon availability, and actual defense issues. This will mean a higher level of responsibility and coordination. A corps commander will have significantly greater opportunities to reinforce a weakened brigade with additional personnel, provide better training for mobilized soldiers and volunteer fighters. To strengthen positions in specific directions, rotate units internally, withdraw battalions when necessary, and adjust the operational area of a brigade by expanding or narrowing its zone of responsibility. In other words, the corps commander will now be responsible for all of this. He will always be present with the troops, overseeing his sector of the front. He will have all the necessary levers to influence the situation directly. He won’t need to seek approval from others—he will have his own forces, his own objectives, and he will be able to make immediate decisions without waiting for approvals or submitting requests. Of course, I am not saying that this system is perfect or that everything will suddenly work flawlessly.

Of course, everything depends on the competence of the commanders. It would be both reasonable and logical for the Ukrainian army not just to pay lip service to NATO standards but to implement them in practice—both in troop management and overall organization. Ideally, Ukraine should have first consolidated its brigades into divisions and only then built a corps-level command structure above them. But things happened as they did. For some reason, the military leadership is irrationally afraid of the word "division." The General Staff reported that creating divisions in Ukraine would be a nightmare, that it is impossible because of the high cost—an additional 450 billion hryvnias. And the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - No one there seems to understand what it really means. But don’t corps require funding as well? Of course, both divisions and corps need financial resources. However, this is absolutely no reason to reject the divisional structure. The problem is that, evidently, no one in the General Staff has ever read the U.S. Army regulations. Their military education is poor, and they fail to grasp that divisions were not created just for the sake of a name or as an unnecessary expense. In reality, they represent an optimized command structure that actually saves money. It does not require additional expenditures; instead, it reduces costs. The chaos created by our military leadership over the last 10 years—through the introduction of these OTGs, TGrs, and OSGTs—has cost the country far more than any properly structured military organization ever would.

But, of course, there is not a single person in our Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief who can explain this. And they all nod and look at the number of views on YouTube and the number of likes on Facebook.

We will push forward, trying other things based on this experience because we see that only public opinion has an impact. Our leaders act only when there is significant public outcry. There's no point in hoping they will suddenly become more educated or start reading books. The war is ongoing, and, unfortunately, they will continue to lead us with the intellectual capacity they currently have. It's low, but what can we do? We have a democratically elected government, and the only way we can influence them is through public opinion. So, we will keep lobbying for these reforms in our military.

I hope that after these commanders of combat-ready brigades become corps commanders, I am fully aware that these 20 corps will never be staffed as described in American military regulations or as presented by the General Staff leadership and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This corps is supposed to include many things – heavy mechanized brigades, anti-aircraft missile regiments, engineering units, and UAVs – but none of this will come to fruition. I do not expect that the creation of these corps will be a panacea, and we should not anticipate an immediate transformation.

The corps’ primary goal is to streamline the organization of troop deployment and increase the accountability of commanders for their decisions. Accountability for personnel, for accomplishing combat missions, for neutralizing the enemy, and for the effective and proper use of weapons and ammunition.

Under what conditions will the corps be effective, and what could hinder their success?

First and foremost, political factors. If Oleksandr Syrskyi continues his ridiculous, absurd practice of interfering in the management of battalions, companies, and brigades through the heads of corps commanders, this will lead to nothing but chaos and disorder. It will simply be under the "corps" label.

I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will stop doing this. His interference in troop command, such as his direct orders to deploy the 32nd and 155th mechanized brigades in battle near Pokrovsk based on his decision, was utterly inept, utterly inept - this is not my subjective judgment, that led to an inept number of losses and the complete failure of the tasks. Sitting in Kyiv, looking at a map, and not understanding the real situation or the capabilities of the troops, it is impossible for Oleksandr Syrskyi to continue interfering in tactical-level command. This is sheer recklessness.

Generals have not learnt anything since 2014. When they had direct command during the ATO, during Debaltseve, they thought that battalion commanders were less understanding than they were at headquarters 200 kilometres away. It's the same now.

The corps was created, among other things, to ensure that no leader above the corps commander would have the right to interfere with the corps commander's responsibility at the tactical level. Now, if these corps functioned effectively, no one except the corps commander should have the authority to intervene in troop management at the tactical level. This is the core issue. If a criminal investigation is launched into the actions of the 155th Brigade, the consequences of how it was employed are directly tied to Oleksandr Syrskyi’s decisions. The losses—his decisions. The number of AWOL cases—his decisions. That is why I sincerely hope that this rightful and necessary initiative, which Oleksandr Stanislavovych Syrskyi is now implementing with the corps, is genuinely aimed at organizing and improving command and control, rather than merely appointing loyal corps commanders, loyal brigade commanders, and then set tasks for battalions and companies through the head of the corps commanders, as he likes to do. And with catastrophically poor efficiency, which no one at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief even evaluates. This chaos must end.

We have professional sock-puppets of Zekenskyy working on the Internet, professional supporters of Syrskyi, so I want to say right away that this chaos existed before him. There was such chaos under Zaluzhnyi, and before. So there was no ambiguity. But the way Syrskyi interferes on such a scale, the way he manages all the brigades in all areas himself, through the head of the entire management structure, there has never been such an absurdity. And the results of this are only disastrous, there is nothing positive in the results of the fighting.

So, if we do not have interference through the head of the corps commanders, if each corps receives a certain number of people every month, no matter whether it is a corps performing a task or any corps, 20 corps commanders should receive at least 300, 400, 500 people every month. This is the minimum number of people to be mobilised. And they will decide where they send them: to engineering units, UAVs, infantry, assault units. This is the decision of the corps commander. And there should be a minimum number of replenishment so that he can always count on a certain minimum number of people. The corps commander must also count on a certain minimum amount of ammunition and drones. Then the corps commander becomes the person on whom resource planning depends. And he can plan his actions.

It is the planning at the operational level that is a complete failure that we have, and this is the advantage that the enemy has at the front. And if this happens, then the rest of the people who are above this number, these people, these drones, this ammunition, will be the resource that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has, which can reinforce any corps deployed at the front. It will be Oleksandr Syrskyi's decision to decide what exactly, which corps he wants to replenish. Above and beyond this minimum requirement. But I want to warn you that if it's going to be a manual regime again, there will be people in Kyiv who don't understand what they are forming, the failure with these 150-series brigades, just a complete chaos. If people sit there in Kyiv again, not understanding the capabilities of the troops, gathering all those mobilised for some new and separate projects and not giving the planned monthly replenishment to each corps commander, this will not improve the situation of the troops. It will be just a lip service to reform, another buffer that has no resources. 

Russian command and organisation of troops are better than Ukrainian at this stage of the war for one reason only: they have an organisational structure. And this organisational structure receives resources. Yes, they have a tactic and a strategy that is aimed at just meaty assaults. But they have a plan for about 30,000 stormtroopers a month, whom they drive to attack under the threat of execution. And these 30,000 are distributed across the entire frontline. And even where there are no active offensives, the enemy still receives planned replenishment, which is determined according to their mobilisation plan, which works for them.

So, if Oleksandr Syrskyi wants to go down in history as a leader who implements effective organizational reforms, earns respect, and strengthens the army through these reforms, he must accept the necessity of proper planning. Planning. And allocating a certain amount of resources—at the very least, ensuring the minimal provision for the troops—which will then be distributed by the corps commanders. This is of fundamental importance. Of course, some units will remain directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and that is a normal practice. But I hope that each corps will be assigned an area of responsibility that matches its capabilities. And a corps commander, appointed from among the best officers of our top brigades, will naturally receive both the authority and the necessary resources. Along with the position.

Because a position without resources is just another administrative bureaucratic burden. The same corps structures that already exist remain in the rear, with large numbers of personnel, logistics, and salaries, essentially duplicating the functions of operational commands. This is a favorite practice of our military leadership—creating endless layers of commands, headquarters, and organizational structures. And all of it is done chaotically, without oversight. Hundreds of military-administrative bodies that have absolutely no impact on the course of combat operations.

Answers to questions

How do they imagine doing this without pulling a hodgepodge of units from the front line?

In reality, no large-scale troop reshuffling along the front is planned. Instead, other units and brigades from the corps will be grouped around those that are already combat-ready. Each corps should be assigned its own area —a unified area for its designated forces. I believe this can be achieved by reinforcing the brigades responsible for the largest areas with additional units. I think this will only improve overall organization. And it can be done without major restructuring at the front. In fact, troop movements are already happening—brigades are constantly being repositioned from one direction to another—but in this case, I believe it can be done without significant organizational changes. It is entirely feasible.

When will the Armed Forces reform Azov’s structure? When will officers from Azov be invited to the General Staff?

We must understand that the army is a vast organism. I mentioned 126 separate brigades, battalions, and regiments, each with its own area of responsibility. Naturally, for the entire army to match the level of our best units, a significant number of capable leaders is required. Leadership in such a large force is always individualized. Some structures have a high concentration of effective, competent combat commanders who are capable of developing successful operational models tailored to their specific branches and units. In other words, restructuring the entire army according to the model of a single unit can only happen after the war. For now, the creation of the corps is focused on scaling up successful command experience and leadership from the best brigades—making these brigades stronger and expanding their operational sectors. This is the only viable approach. We shouldn't expect that simply appointing someone will instantly change everything. Reforms must be gradual. Right now, Azov brigade commander Denys Prokopenko is being entrusted with an entire corps. Instead of leading just one brigade, he will oversee five, allowing him to scale his experience to a higher level. Believe me, at this stage, that is more than enough. Similarly, our other combat-ready brigades will be expanded. We will assess which corps demonstrate the best results, efficiency, and leadership models. I believe there will be valuable lessons to learn from many of our military units.

Why are people still being transferred from air defense to infantry after the public outcry?

In our country, no matter how much attention an issue receives, it does not compel the military or political leadership to take action. They only respond if there is an overwhelming wave of public outrage and a ready-made solution that can be imposed on them. Otherwise, they simply do nothing. That’s why no decisions have been made so far, and the transfers continue. In other words, the country’s leadership does not understand how to deploy personnel effectively. They assess the situation purely based on positions on a map where infantry units are stationed. There is little understanding among military leaders and generals regarding the importance of technical branches, how to use them properly to preserve infantry lives and achieve combat objectives. Some individual commanders do recognize this, but unfortunately, it is not a systemic approach. The core issue is that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is made up of completely irresponsible people who talk a lot but never act—unless they are repeatedly pressured and forced into making concrete decisions, as was the case with the corps reforms. Now we will see how long it actually takes for them to implement this reform.

Were the TCR bombings the work of the FSB?

Yes, these are the actions of the FSB.

The Marines have been transferred to the corps, but they are not receiving reinforcements at all.

Yes, for a long time, the Marines were excluded from the list of units eligible for reinforcements. However, they have now started receiving personnel, mainly transferred from the Air Force. I hope that the marines, who are performing very difficult tasks in the most difficult areas of the front, will be given time to prepare the replenishment they receive to ensure that the combat capability of the marines is high. Indeed, this is the problem. We have created a massive number of military units without ensuring they have adequate mobilization resources, no one is thinking about how to train and replenish these forces in a timely manner, which is why they are slowly being ground down. This problem stems from the fact that, in our army, the highest-ranking officer with real authority is a brigade commander. While an important figure, he is still just one among 114 ground forces brigade commanders. As a result, such officers are often quietly sidelined. In the Marine Corps, many commanders have raised concerns and fought for proper reinforcements, timely troop allocations, and sufficient training periods. Unfortunately, some of these commanders have even been dismissed from their positions, which is deeply regrettable.

Friends, I am very grateful for your support. I want to say that yesterday was the third anniversary of the Butusov Plus channel. And I am grateful to everyone who supports the work of the channel, to everyone who watches. We started almost from scratch and now have one million two hundred and fifty thousand subscribers. I am very grateful to you. We have two thousand seven hundred sponsors who support the channel. Twenty people have been supporting the channel for almost three years. I am deeply grateful for your support and donations—only thanks to them can we continue our work. From the ground up, we have built a substantial audience, and this support allows us to film, document the war, speak about it, and highlight critical issues. As we can see, with such a large audience, we have the ability to bring crucial messages and public sentiment to the country's leadership. I fully understand that our influence comes solely from the number of people who stand with us and, most importantly, from your trust in our work. Friends, thank you for standing together, for working together, and for supporting Ukraine's defence forces. The reform of creating corps is essential not only for the defence forces but for the entire Ukrainian nation. We honor the heroic deeds of our soldiers—Ukrainian warriors who, at this very moment, as I speak to you from the studio, are holding the thin blue line that separates Ukraine from destruction. Thank you for this broadcast, friends. Glory to Ukraine!