Arsen Zhumadilov: Bezrukova essentially created system that put all pressure on her, since everyone knew that she alone was making key decisions

Whether the minister likes it or not, he bears full political responsibility for this. By recalling two members of the DPA’s supervisory board, Umierov has effectively taken sole control over arms procurement. For the past week, the agency has been led by Arsen Zhumadilov, a significantly more loyal figure to the minister.

Many in Ukraine regret that two competent procurement specialists—Zhumadilov and Bezrukova—were forced into direct confrontation. But the key question remains: can Zhumadilov streamline the procurement process more effectively than Bezrukova?

The arms market is vastly different from that of military apparel, helmets, and rations. Even in these areas, the DPA has struggled to avoid pitfalls - that’s why it was particularly interesting to hear Zhumadilov’s perspective on the agency’s work, his goals, and whether the Ministry has a concrete action plan.

Disclaimer: There is no plan.

"You are not yet responsible for most of the issues we’re about to discuss, nor have you had the time to fully grasp them. But your stance now will define the key principles and approaches you will work by, and it's crucial to establish these from the outset," said Yurii Butusov at the beginning of the interview.

The interview lasted just 45 minutes—nowhere near enough time to cover everything. However, we did manage to ask about the current state of the DPA and Zhumadilov’s vision for fixing its problems.

- Let's start with your status.

- How is your status defined for the DPA and the DOT?

- As of now, my status is as follows: I am the head of the DOT—this remains unchanged. Additionally, I am the acting head of the DPA during the absence of the agency's permanent head.

Last week, I was the acting head due to the suspension of the previous director. As of this week, I continue to serve as acting head due to the absence of a permanent director. This is because the previous head was dismissed by order of the Minister.

- I understand that you have been in contact with Rustem Umierov, which you confirmed in your post following the widely known statement by the Minister. But how did the Minister outline his vision for resolving this situation? For example, will there be an open competition for the position of DPA head? Will the state-appointed members of the supervisory board be replaced, and will they, together with the Ministry of Defense, agree on a new director? How is this process expected to unfold?

- In fact, the Minister's request to me was primarily to assess what would be most effective for the organization, ensuring its smooth and efficient operation.

His main concern was the internal processes within the agency and how the DPA interacts with the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, aiming for a more efficient system than before. Regarding the appointment of a permanent head and the composition of the supervisory board, he also entrusted me with forming a recommendation. The key objective is to ensure continuity in ongoing work, prevent disruptions, and maintain stability in operations and so on.

- Okay, then the question is: how do you see this structure? Should the head simply be appointed by the minister without any supervisory board involvement, or should the supervisory board be reconstituted, and, accordingly, a new head appointed through a competitive selection process in coordination between the minister and the supervisory board?

- Well, I’ll put it this way: in general, I support institutions having depth in governance, with checks and balances in place, including the creation of supervisory boards where appropriate, to ensure they effectively fulfill their role as gatekeepers, from one hand. From the other hand, looking at what happened with the supervisory board of the DPA, I wouldn’t want to repeat the same mistake. In my view, instead of professionally executing its functions, the board effectively stalled the agency’s operations for some time.

And this issue isn’t just about the head of the agency—it also concerns the approval of major financial commitments. As you know, when a supervisory board is established, it is responsible for approving significant contractual obligations that fall within a certain value threshold. And from what we are currently seeing, a substantial portion of these obligations—referred to as SFCs (Significant Financial Commitments)—have been left in limbo.

- As far as I understand, they have not been approved for over a month…

- A month, exactly. When the supervisory board was set up, they should have worked through these issues in advance, but they failed to do so. Moreover, the board was not prepared to provide a framework approval for all SFCs, which would have allowed the management to proceed without having to approve every individual state contract separately. At the same time, they were also unprepared to fully engage in their responsibilities and actually get to work.

And this is a very large amount of work.

At DOT, for example, when the supervisory board was launched, even before their first formal meeting, we held a constituent meeting and said that look, there will be a question right away, in addition to questions about who is the chairman, who is in which committee, and so on, there will be a question about significant economic obligations.

What will be your position? There is this option, there is that option, there are these scenarios, these scenarios, think about what is best for you, given the kind of work you plan to build, that is, how much time and attention you are really ready to devote to this functionality. And, accordingly, when they were launched at the first meeting, this issue was considered. We didn't stop anything, the DPA did. What am I saying? That when we launch a new structure, we must understand for sure that it will not stop the work, especially in such a key agency as the DPA.

- I think there is still a question about how this selection process was conducted. In essence, we needed to recruit specialists with expertise in corporate governance, but the outcome was not entirely successful.

- I'll put it this way: in my opinion, the composition of residents and non-residents on that supervisory board was not the best combination.

Currently, our supervisory board includes only one non-resident—a British citizen—who has a strong understanding of how to build an effective supply chain. He possesses the necessary expertise. However, naturally, he is not familiar with our legal framework, especially its nuances related to defense legislation.

At the same time, there are four resident members—our own citizens—who are highly knowledgeable in key areas. One specialist has a deep understanding of finance, another is well-versed in auditing, a third is an expert in procurement processes, and another has a strong grasp of our military ecosystem. In my view, this is a well-balanced combination.

- Who are they?

- These are members of our Supervisory Board at the DOT. For instance, Yuliia Marushevska has extensive knowledge of how the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces, and the General Staff operate, including the vertical, horizontal, and cross-functional relationships within these institutions.

Nadiia Bihun has a thorough understanding of procurement processes and currently serves as the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
We also have Mykola Raienko, a certified auditor with extensive experience, along with other specialists.

- Have you been in contact with the supervisory board of the DPA?

- Since this body is currently non-functional, I see no reason to engage with it—it serves no practical purpose. And frankly, I have things to do at the moment.

- I understand that despite the existence of two or three audits by the MoD (Ministry of Defense), you were assigned the role of a fourth auditor. What have you observed in the work of the DPA over these past few days?

- A large percentage of goods were not delivered to the front—47% of the supply plan that the DPA submitted to the Defense Ministry and the General Staff was not fulfilled. (After the interview was published, Zhumadilov's press service made corrections and removed one of the statements that the DPA did not contract anything as needed.)

At the State Operator For Non-Lethal Acquisition, our focus this year has been on analyzing processes from the perspective of ensuring the army’s needs are met, whereas the Defense Procurement Agency has been primarily focused on procurement itself. My task is to balance these approaches to maximize the efficiency of army supply.

- Some functions are working well. For example, the financial function—it has well-established structures and processes, and personnel clearly understand their areas of responsibility. There is also a quite good analytical function—they have a clear grasp of contracts, figures, and other key data. However, one critical issue stands out today—the procurement process is structured in a way that an overwhelming number of decisions are made solely by the head of the agency.

And in my view, this is the biggest flaw. Maryna, or Ms. Bezrukova—I'm not sure what the proper way to refer to her is—has built a system where everything depends on her personal decisions.

Why is this a problem? There are two key reasons.

First of all, no single person can physically process and oversee everything alone. That’s why we've seen cases where commercial proposals were lost, and some manufacturers had to raise a public outcry just to get noticed and secure a contract. This is the first major issue.

The second issue is that when the system is centered solely around one person, everyone understands that applying direct pressure on them can yield the desired result.

- One of the key criticisms of the MoD audit was the lack of a proper system for processing commercial proposals. However, Artem Sytnyk claimed that they had developed a system ensuring no leaks and that each proposal was reviewed within three days. From your perspective, what is the actual situation with proposal processing?

-First, commercial offers are received in such a way that there is no unified register that would be available to all those who work with them in a suitable form.

Instead, there is simply a massive Excel spreadsheet containing 11,000 rows—the total number of commercial proposals received over this period. And that’s it. This is completely unsuitable as an analytical tool.

- You mean even without a specification and classification into nomenclatures?

- That is, there is a list, and if you try to expand it, the file will become so large that you will need to purchase a specialized computer and assign a dedicated specialist to handle it. However, proper work with commercial offers involves integrating them into a digital system, where, for instance, you have a supplier registry. Each supplier should be linked to a specific commercial offer within a given category.

This supplier registry must accumulate data on how suppliers fulfill their contracts—whether there have been breaches, whether they have overdue receivables, or whether there is intelligence indicating that their ultimate beneficiaries, for example, are listed under sanctions.

-Is this actually supposed to be the registry envisaged by NATO's strategic recommendations?

- Amongst others. That’s the first aspect. But even before commercial proposals are received, there are critical questions concerning market analysis.

Let me give you an example. There is a specific nomenclature—I won’t disclose which—but it is widely produced worldwide. I ask the head of the relevant office: "You have received commercial offers, and now you are presenting them—these are the offers, these are the prices, and so forth. But did you receive these as responses to a formal request for commercial offers? Are you certain that the data we currently possess so to say reflects the global market situation? There are manufacturers, their capacity is so-and-so, we analyzed them, contacted them, they refused, but there are some suppliers who have them in their warehouses, they are ready, and so on and so forth...." 

So, it's not just about accepting offers, but about proactively engaging with the markets. And that’s not happening.

I asked, 'Have you considered proactively working with foreign markets on this issue?' They responded, 'Well, that's handled by our international department.' So, I asked the international team, 'What exactly are you responsible for? Do you have regional representatives in North America, Europe, or the Middle East? Do you track which countries manufacture this particular nomenclature so that we understand where and how it is produced?'

They replied, 'No, we don’t have the budget for business trips.' Are you serious?

- But the audit criticized them for excessive business trips.

- Well, if the trips are justified, they should be happening. As the books teach, if you're responsible for a certain nomenclature, you shouldn't be spending your days scrolling through random Telegram channels and obscure websites—except, of course, Censor. Instead, you should be monitoring industry-specific websites, trade journals, newspapers, and forums, particularly those in countries where the relevant production is based. You need to know what’s happening—where production is expanding, where it's declining, which factories are ramping up capacity, which ones are struggling, and who has made a contract with whom and so on.

You need to gather all this intelligence so that when a requirement appears, you can respond proactively and efficiently. In other words, even before receiving commercial offers, you should have already analyzed the market.

- Alright, but what about evaluating commercial offers and pricing?

- I asked, 'How do you assess them?' They said, "Well, sometimes we just look at the price and make a contract with the lowest price. Other times, we consider the payment terms—whether an advance payment is required or not."

 - And what about the delivery date?

- Yes. 'We also take the delivery date and the supplier into account.' I said: 'OK, from what I hear, do I understand correctly that there are specific criteria for each aspect of the nomenclature.

Before evaluating commercial offers, you have already established your priorities—for example, if this nomenclature is critically needed today, then within certain limits, delivery time becomes the top priority.

Or, vice versa. We have it in our warehouses, everything is fine, we just need to close it in a year. And even if the delivery is planned for November or December, we look at the price.

If it’s lower, then it`s OK, it takes priority.

But that’s not the case. They determine priorities on the go, so to speak.

What does this mean? First of all, it presents a corruption risk. I’m not saying they are necessarily engaged in corruption, but this kind of approach creates uncertainty for the market.

Suppliers don’t understand the contracting rules. They don’t know the criteria by which a particular offer gets approved.

If we are talking about an institution, there have been a lot of public reactions about how institutions are being undermined. When we talk about an institution, it is not just an organization. An institution is a set of rules—established for both internal operations and interactions with external partners—that everyone adheres to.

This is what an institution is—it’s the playing field, so to speak. You create a playing field and say, 'Here are the rules, guys.'

- So, these rules didn’t exist?

- That’s not all. The system operates with minimal managerial discretion—in other words, it shouldn’t depend on the subjective decisions of a manager. Let me give an example.

I am handed a payment order and told, 'It’s your decision whether to approve the payment or not.' I ask, 'Wait, from what I understand, this is a payment upon delivery.'

They respond, 'Yes.' I ask, 'Has the delivery taken place?' 'Yes.' 'Are the expense reports signed?' 'Yes.'

Then I ask, 'So what exactly am I supposed to decide?' They say, 'Well, we’re used to all payments being subject to managerial approval. The manager decides whether a payment goes through or not.' I say, 'Wait, if payment upon delivery were discretionary—meaning it was our right, not our obligation, to pay upon delivery—then I would understand that it requires managerial approval.'"

And if it is our contractual obligation to make the payment within, for example, 10 days from the date of delivery and the submission of the necessary documents, then there is no decision for me to make. I don’t need to decide anything further. Because if you start making additional decisions, what does that imply? It means that in some cases, you approve the payment, while in others, you think, 'I don’t like this supplier, so I’ll delay it,' and so on.

It shouldn’t work like that. The process should be as algorithmic as possible, not left to personal discretion or arbitrary choices.

So, what happened with Maryna? She essentially created a system that put all pressure on her, since everyone knew that she alone was making key decisions.

- What was your impression of the team? Because at DOT, you built your team from scratch, while Maryna inherited hers, at least partially, from the previous leadership. How effective is this team now? Do changes need to be made?

- Based on my experience in reorganizing large structures—which, as the books say, is quite typical—about 80% of employees, generally speaking, don’t care who the leader is. They simply do their job.

And, in most cases, they perform it professionally and with integrity.

- It seems that you and Artem Sytnyk have read the same book…

- Maybe. … About 10% of people begin to lose the world they had built—it starts falling apart for them, and they find it very difficult to adapt. They become overly anxious about it, worry too much, and pass on this anxiety to others. It’s better to part ways with such people. Yesterday, I held a meeting with the entire team where I explained that our sole mission is to support the Armed Forces. That is our only goal. If someone has grown too attached to the previous manager and feels they cannot work without her, that’s understandable. People sometimes tend to form strong emotional attachments to their leaders.

If they choose to initiate a conversation, we will review our working relationship with them. On the other hand, there are those who see an opportunity to realize something.

They recognize a new vision, a new approach. They are ready to get involved, they are ready to be proactively involved. There are such people.

So, what is my task today? It is to ensure that those who are working and fulfilling their responsibilities can continue to do so. Those who find the transition too difficult should be able to leave quietly and find their place elsewhere. And those who have ideas and the desire to make an impact should receive the support they need.

- Since I mentioned Artem Sytnyk, I can't help but ask—how has your relationship with Bezrukova's deputy developed?

- I wouldn’t say it has developed in any particular way. We've met a few times, but there's a lot of work to do. Plus, he’s currently on a business trip and not in the country. So I don’t really have any special comments on that.

-Alright. Arsen, this conversation just gave me a strong sense of déjà vu.

I remember when you were the head of the state procurement enterprise at the Ministry of Health, you wrote a post on Facebook exactly 4 years ago, in early February 2021, that you had your own vision of the priorities for the procurement of medicines. A big conflict arose. One of the NABU employees called me and said that there is an honest person here, the head of the state procurement enterprise, who defends his transparent institutional position on the procurement of medicines.

But Minister of Health Stepanov, who wanted to control all financial flows manually, simply fabricated reasons to take this guy down—so that he could sign off on whatever he wanted with the right suppliers. Exactly four years ago, on February 11, the Ministry of Health held a press conference, and I remember hearing statements that Arsen Zhumadilov had caused massive losses of one billion hryvnias, had failed to procure medicines on time, and that, because of him, a billion hryvnias had to be returned to the state budget due to his inability to use the funds in time. They claimed he was too slow in setting up procedures, that his procurement process was sluggish. And listening to those exact words back then—from Deputy Minister Shatalova and Minister Stepanov—I can’t shake the feeling that when Minister Umierov and President Zelenskyy recently needed to justify the urgent removal of Bezrukova, they simply took that same script from your press conference four years ago and replaced the names.

So, tell me, do you believe this change is purely a political move by the leadership—the minister, the president—who aren’t actually interested in building institutions, but instead want to manually direct funds to their preferred companies, just like they did during your time at the Ministry of Health? Please respond.

- This cosplay by Maryna reminds me of that story from four years ago in terms of form, but not in substance.

I'll explain why. In the case of Stepanov, we were dealing with a blatantly corrupt official who was formally suspected by the NABU and is now evading prosecution abroad. He was well-known in certain circles in the Odesa region, where I once had the honor of working alongside Governor Saakashvili—whom Stepanov eventually replaced as head of the Odesa Regional State Administration if I recall correctly. In Odesa, Stepanov had a notorious reputation as a bribe-taker. He controlled financial flows in road construction and the healthcare sector. When he was appointed minister, for those familiar with his deeds of a hero, there was no doubt that he was acting in pursuit of corrupt interests.

In the current situation, however, I fail to see what exactly the opposing side is fighting against, so to speak. I have known the minister for quite some time, one can, of course, attribute certain flaws to him—that’s a matter of subjective judgment—but he is definitively not a corrupt official.

Throughout my tenure, for example, he has never once abused his position to pressure us into taking certain actions or securing any improper advantage. Not a single decision or action on his part indicated a pursuit of corrupt interests. The same applies to his previous roles—wherever he worked, no one I know who had dealings with him could ever accuse him of corruption.

Likewise, he cannot be accused of collaborating with the enemy. This person is genuinely patriotic, I still remember that back in the 2000s, he once said: "It is absurd that in the Ukrainian state, Crimean Tatars are treated as outsiders." Meaning that people of any nationality can advance in their careers, both in the corporate world and in the public sector—but not Crimean Tatars.

- I'm sorry, let me clarify. So you've known each other since the 2000s. How did you meet?

- We met because we are from Crimea—we are Crimean Tatars.

Crimean Tatars from Crimea who lived and studied in Kyiv. Basically, we all knew each other because there were barely a hundred of us, and you simply know your fellow countrymen.

It is interesting that the same NABU officer who previously flagged Minister Stepanov’s corrupt activities is now raising concerns about the corrupt interests of the current Minister Umierov. This has nothing to do with nationality—it is purely about the organization of work. And we’ll see in four years what happens to Mr. Umierov, just as we saw with Mr. Stepanov.

Right now, our discussion is strictly about operational logic. And I am not saying this to take the mickey out of you or to challenge the minister, but to establish, from the outset, the question of accountability—who is responsible for what. The case of Bezrukova interests me not because I am deeply concerned about the fate of an individual mid-level government official, but because I want to see tangible improvements in your work—particularly in the supply of ammunition and weaponry to the Ukrainian army.

That is my sole concern. And so, I want to emphasize that what is happening now is yet another example of unclear and inefficient manual control. You made a very valid point: there is no enterprise analysis, no registry, no structured communication, no assessment, no prioritization of procurement—everything is overly centralized and lacks a systemic approach.

But excuse me, I have a question: why is the head of the Defense Procurement Agency responsible for this? There is a Minister of Defense, and he has a deputy specifically in charge of procurement. Don't you think it should be the Minister of Defense who sets the rules for ammunition procurement? Not just some pleasant woman who, in my opinion, was appointed merely to oversee the procurement process.

In other words, Umierov has shifted his responsibility onto Bezrukova and has distanced himself from the process.

I appreciate what you are saying now—that pricing, suppliers, their track records, and procurement priorities must be clearly defined. It’s hard to disagree with that. But is defining these priorities really within the competence of the head of the Defense Procurement Agency? You`ll be heading DPA.

Frankly speaking, if you were the one making these determinations, I would consider it utterly absurd. The formulation of state policy and the allocation of funds for ammunition and armaments during wartime should not be decided by the head of an agency. This is a matter of national policy—it directly affects the country’s security.

Are you saying you have no influence over this? And I have a question: where is the accountability of the Minister of Defense? Where are his regulatory directives? Is he going to take responsibility for this at all?

- First of all, political responsibility at the level of the Deputy Minister was acknowledged in this situation with the DPA.

Dmytro Klimenkov was dismissed precisely because the DPA's operations were not properly organized. Now, regarding whether the DPA can assume responsibility for certain aspects or if the minister is solely accountable—yes, the agency can take on responsibility. The reason separate institutions are established is to serve as additional centers of accountability within the defense ecosystem, this prevents the entire ecosystem from relying solely on the minister and instead ensures a more resilient and sustainable structure with multiple points of oversight.

And when, for example, we say in the case of DOT that something has been delivered, for example, of substandard quality, or substandard quality has not been accepted, and so on.

If it was of substandard quality, such as previous incidents with canned food or military uniforms—technically, this is not within our direct responsibility. However, we have always responded accordingly.

This is precisely why independent agencies are created, rather than simply forming additional structural units within the Ministry of Defense.

- Has the minister formally set objectives for all this? 

When it comes to dismissing Klimenkov, Bezrukova, or anyone else—Ivanov, Petrov, maybe even Zhumadilov—has the minister issued such directives in writing?

- You sound like someone who has never worked in the civil service. Not everything is documented in writing.

-I did not work.

- Look, I don't know what tasks were set for Klimenkov and Bezrukova, but I understand my tasks. 

-So the minister didn't tell you anything when he appointed you?

-He did. No, he told me. I said that I didn't know what tasks Klimenkov and Bezrukova had.

I said that I understood my tasks. I don't have it in writing.

-You were not shown this?

-In writing, how do you see it?

-Look, you've just given us a task, how we should correct our work. Do these requirements exist in writing from the minister?

-Why would I need it in writing from the Minister if I understand my responsibility within the mandate on the basis of which the DPA was created?

And the DPA was created to best meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, right? That is, in a timely manner, in the full scope.

- Last week, I was "delighted" to learn that, apparently, we don't even know which departments within the Ministry of Defense are responsible for purchasing trucks. This is because the Ministry of Finance did not grant the DPA the authority to use state guarantees. Doesn't this seem like a serious misalignment of functions?

- Yes, these procurement functions should absolutely be transferred to the DPA, that’s the right approach.

- Now, regarding what happened with Bezrukova and the DPA in general—both under its previous leadership and now—I’d like to hear your perspective. We’re facing a situation where the military, being very generous by nature, has outlined procurement needs far exceeding the state’s available budget. When demand is that high but funds are limited—and only the DPA, together with the minister, knows the actual financial constraints—DPA essentially transforms into a de facto planning body. It decides what can and will be procured.

It turns out that, on paper, the General Staff determines the needs, but in reality, during a war like this, they need everything—so the actual procurement priorities are set by the DPA. And neither the minister, nor Klimenkov, nor anyone else—again, I emphasize that I specifically asked both the minister and the head of the DPA—has produced a single planning document for the available budget.

Don't you think that if you don't have such a planning document, then instead of Maryna, now Arsen will be the one sitting there, receiving all these demands from above, calls, threats, and exacting it immediately. And you, too, will be forced to make personal choices, saying, ‘Yes, we’ll buy this,’ simply because someone called from the top. Once again, instead of being a body that executes procurement procedures, you will become the one planning ammunition purchases.

- This is actually a very good question because from what I see now, there is a real substitution of concepts happening. In some cases, the General Staff is overstepping the DPA’s mandate by specifying commercial brand names for certain types of equipment—when they shouldn’t be doing so. Instead, they should allow open tender procedures.

- This happens mostly with UAVs…

- Not only drones, actually. This also applies to specialized equipment, ground vehicles, and more.

There are cases where multiple manufacturers can offer products that fully meet TCSs (tactical characteristics and specifications). Instead of allowing competition, the General Staff pre-selects commercial brand names. In my opinion, this is a bad practice.

If we are not talking about a unique product with licensed technology, we must shift toward defining TCSs rather than specific brands. We need to foster competition. This is not something the General Staff should be doing.

The same issue exists within the DPA. From what I have been briefed on, there was indeed a recurring practice of pulling commercial offers for specific product categories—essentially contracting for what’s known as secondary needs.

And they said, "Look, this is what you prioritized for us, but we can’t buy it right now. There are no commercial offers that meet the delivery deadlines, for example, or fit within the budget. But we have a very good offer for a second-priority item."

And second priority is essentially a vast pool of completely different items, all contracted with various suppliers at a wide range of prices. Then the General Staff was presented with an option: "Look, we can buy this for you." But in reality, it seemed manipulative—or at the very least, something that could be manipulated. It allowed someone to pull from the back shelf an item that, for some reason, suddenly became more appealing.

Whether due to external pressure or personal interest.

And this once again shows how an improper planning function has crept into the DPA—something that should not be there. This process needs to be properly regulated. Right now, we are working on fine-tuning our procedures for interacting with the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to prevent such situations from happening in the future.

- I am very grateful for this because it is a direct remark addressed to Minister Umierov, who oversees the Department of Military-Technical Policy, which issued such an order to the DPA. Priority 1, Priority 2. And then, within the DPA, after the minister personally reduces Priority 1 and Priority 2, the very issue you described arises—an incorrect, in my view, option, where they make the selection.

But again, whose responsibility is this? The Minister of Defense. He must take a clear position on this; otherwise, you will find yourself in the same difficult situation as your predecessor.

-Yes and no, because, as a rule, the real expertise is concentrated at the lower levels.

- Where exactly, сan I clarify? Who in the DPA possesses expertise in armaments and munitions?

- Those who are so-called subject-matter experts—people who understand what they are procuring, as well as those familiar with the acquisition process.

These are not necessarily legal experts, though they often are. In the DOT, for instance, whenever something was not functioning properly—I'm sure you can back me up on this—we frequently, if not always, initiated amendments to the Ministry of Defense’s regulations to improve efficiency.

-And then for four months Klimenkov could not sign the order...

- I remember that too.

- Well, let me give you a specific example that you will inevitably encounter. I'll mention just one, though I know of many more. I was genuinely surprised to see that the amount of ammunition currently being procured—155mm and 105mm caliber—is, relative to the needs of the front, extremely limited. It is, in fact, a negligible quantity. We're not even talking about hundreds of thousands.

Meanwhile, funds are being spent on purchasing free-flight missiles for GRAD systems with a range of 20 kilometers, or unguided rockets for helicopters—systems that lack both precision and real operational demand at the front.

Yes, they are needed—because everything is needed—but when it comes to setting priorities, such critical decisions are being delegated to the DPA. And the DPA is acquiring free-flight missiles on the market at approximately €4,500 per unit.

For the cost of two such missiles, three new 155mm shells could be purchased—artillery rounds that are in urgent demand at the front and in critically short supply. Yet, it turns out that there is no clear accountability within the state or the Ministry of Defense. So I'm interested in what kind of expertise is this, how is it being formed, what is it based on?

- There absolutely needs to be a productive yet difficult dialogue between the General Staff on one side and the Ministry of Defense on the other.

- You do realize that the General Staff, in principle, can adjust procurement needs in favor of certain manufacturers, right? It’s just that we prefer not to openly discuss the corruption risks involved.

- Of course. That’s precisely why I insist there needs to be a difficult and highly transparent dialogue between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.

The Ministry of Defense must ask the General Staff tough, uncomfortable questions about how exactly these priorities are determined. What gets top priority.

- And if, after another 11 months, the minister still hasn’t asked these questions, who will be held accountable? Another deputy minister, you, or the minister himself?

- I believe that during this time, we will shed light on many issues and provide the Ministry with the necessary recommendations to ensure this process is structured properly. After all, we are part of this process.

All these issues are critical, but I only have five minutes left.

- Alright. Then let’s talk about the 120mm mortar rounds. A massive scheme has taken place. The Ministry of Strategic Industries, led by Kamyshin and Smetanin, fabricated the claim that state-owned enterprises had the capacity to produce 1,900,000 rounds—despite the fact that in 2023, these facilities had not manufactured a single mortar round. And as a result, without any proper documentation, the Ministry of Defense forced the DPA to sign a contract with enterprises under the Ministry of Strategic Industries.

Now, 57,000 faulty mortar rounds have been recalled, resulting in billions in losses. In reality, the number of faulty rounds is much higher, but the troops simply do not return them because they receive nothing in exchange. So, I have a major question. Will you initiate the process of reclaiming the funds for the Ministry of Defense? Will you conduct a full inspection of these mortar rounds, their fuzes, and the overall manufacturing quality of the ammunition that the DPA was forced to procure? And will you sign a new contract with enterprises under the Ministry of Strategic Industries for the next year?

- First of all, regarding substandard ammunition and similar issues—of course, the funds must be refunded, penalties must be imposed, and accountability must follow.

As for new contracts, will they be signed? They must be reassessed to ensure that the risks encountered are properly managed. We cannot afford to address defects only when they have already reached the front lines—when soldiers attempt to fire them and they fail. Instead, new safeguards must be implemented at much earlier stages to ensure strict oversight of production quality.

Will we continue signing contracts with domestic manufacturers despite these risks? Yes, we will, but going forward, we will enforce significantly stricter quality control measures in both contract terms and execution than has been done in the past.

- How do you plan to do this? Will you allow the Anti-Corruption Council to be involved in this process?

- If there are no restrictions related to security clearance, classified access, or other confidentiality concerns, then I see no problem with that.

However, in general, we are currently reviewing the role of military procurement officers, who are part of the Ministry of Defense, to internalize some of their functions within the DPA. This will ensure that we have direct oversight of contract execution. This is a very interesting initiative. And what matters here—and I am addressing you as journalists—is that, in my opinion, there is currently a somewhat skewed narrative that the DPA's primary task is simply to contract and pay as quickly as possible, сontract and pay.

Yet, very little attention is given to the fact that those who receive contracts and payments must properly fulfill their obligations. We need to shift the focus toward contractor accountability.

- And I fully support that. And penalties!

- The last question I need a brief answer to. Will an audit be conducted, and will you be able to provide the Ministry of Defense's Anti-Corruption Council with information on how procurement was carried out under Defense Minister Reznikov in 2022-2023? There is unofficial information that weapon procurement contracts worth 40 billion hryvnias were not fully executed, the money has disappeared—it is simply theft.

We need someone in the Ministry of Defense to file a criminal complaint. That is the first issue. Secondly, according to the Anti-Corruption Action Center, up to 350 billion hryvnias worth of Defense Ministry contracts are overdue. The ministry continues to extend them, yet they remain unfulfilled.

This is a systemic issue involving massive amounts of public funds. In my view, it requires public oversight. Will you take the initiative to ensure the Anti-Corruption Council gains access to this information?

-First of all, I don't know this information today. I heard it. And I have a question: did you and the previous manager communicate a lot before the merger?

- Like the council? Not officially.

- Why?

- Because both the DMTP (Department of Military-Technical Policy) and the DPA argued that we do not have access to classified information. With you (DOT), it's always easier because you're not restricted by state secrecy.

- I just want to emphasize that this mine issue is not actually a matter of state secrecy. You only need to examine what components these mines were assembled with, and it becomes immediately clear why they failed to detonate.

The fuzes were well-known; the specific fuze marks were openly identifiable on at least half of these mines, which were originally intended for artillery shells...

-Look, let me put it this way. All these issues in which we can be open without exposing national security issues to some kind of compromise and data leakage, then we will be absolutely transparent.

- Despite the fact that working with some representatives of civil society can be quite difficult, and I sometimes get the impression that they are biased and do not fully perform their function as neutral observers, we will remain transparent. Just like today, we met with you, we discussed things—this will continue.

And when it comes to certain problematic issues, we will maintain transparency. As for how exactly this oversight mechanism will function, given the restrictions on the DPA, I am not yet ready to say.

- Then, allow us to schedule one final meeting with you regarding all these unresolved issues related to ammunition and armaments that have accumulated. 

Let's do this to avoid repeating the unfortunate experience of the Minister of Health and not put the current Minister of Defense under the same fire from NABU. Let's agree that in a month, once you have sorted things out, we will talk again, and based on the work you have been building, you will be able to report on what has been done regarding the issues you have just outlined.

Tetiana Nikolaienko, Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET